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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM*
JAY P. KESAN** AND ANDRES A. GALLO***

In recent years, many reform proposals have been presented in
Congress for changing the patent system in the United States.
Most of these proposals have been normative in nature and
based on overcoming the many perceived shortcomings of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office's ("Patent Office")
performance. Nonetheless, actual legislative reforms have failed
to materialize.
In this Article, we claim that in order to understand the chances
of success of any reform to the patent system, we should take a
closer look at the patent system's political economy.
In
particular,we should be aware of the different pressure groups
with a stake in the system and their ability to influence
congressional committees through which reform legislation is
enacted. We study the different constituencies favoring or
opposing the reform and the strength of their bargainingpower
based on publicly available empirical data on political
contributions by different groups and analyze the impact of
politicalcontributions to individual congressionalrepresentatives
on individual floor votes on the Patent Reform Bill of 2007. In
addition, we also take into account the effect of the patent system
on different technology industries and economic sectors. As we
show, each proposal will generate winners and losers who will
try to push reforms forward or prevent them from being enacted.
In order to succeed, any reform will need a minimum consensus
among these stakeholder groups: firms in different technology
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sectors, inventors, the patent bar (divided separately into patent
prosecutorsand litigators), the Patent Office, and the courts.
Given the politicalprocesses, the final result of any reform will
depart from any theoretical blueprint we describe in this Article.
As a consequence, a deeper understanding of this political
process allows us to better understand the dynamics of reforms
and the resultant characteristicsof the patent system. In the end,
as in any other institutional device, the characteristics and
performance of the patent system, plus its sustainability or
reforms over time, depend on the preferences of the polity,
specifically on the preferences of the groups with a definite stake
in the performance of the system. We also determine that the
effects of the patent system on different technology and economic
sectors will ultimately shape the different constituencies favoring
or opposing the reform. We observe that supportfor any patent
reform will depend on the specific factors that define the
structure of each economic sector. Furthermore, in each sector,
firms have different preferences depending on their economic
power and particularstakes in the patent system.
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INTRODUCTION

The patent system in the United States elicits increasing concerns
over its efficiency, especially with respect to the performance of the
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U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office").' The major
criticism leveled at the Patent Office is that the quality of the patents
it issues is deficient.2 Many patents granted are later found invalid, in
whole or in part, because they lack innovation. "This type of error
has important economic consequences, as it generates inefficient
resource allocation and hurts economic growth."' 4 Consequently, the
Patent Office has faced widespread criticism of its patent-granting
procedures.5 First, patents seem to be granted too fast, without a
thorough examination of the requests.6 Compared to other worldclass patent offices, such as those in Japan and the European Union,
the U.S. Patent Office fares relatively poorly in terms of high rates of
acceptance and low levels of review.7 Second, the Patent Office is not

1. For a discussion of criticisms of the Patent Office and reform proposals, see
generally John Allison & Mark Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002); Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents:
Chaos at the USPTO or Business as Usual?, 2001 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 347; Jay P. Kesan,
Carrotsand Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002);
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How
Should We Change? The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61 (2006);
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001);
Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999);
Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and
Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2001-2002);
John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 [hereinafter Thomas, Collusion and Collective
Action in the Patent System]; John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker:
ComparativeApproaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727
(2002) [hereinafter Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker].
2. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent
System: Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 996-97
(2004) (defining patent quality).
3. See Kesan, supra note 1, at 797.
4. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 63-64.
5. See, e.g., id. at 63 n.2.
6. See Kesan, supra note 1, at 765-66; see also Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., The
Proliferation of Electronic Commerce Patents: Don't Blame the PTO, 28 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 121, 123 (2002) ("The real problem can be summarized by a
1999 survey conducted by Greg Aharonian, which revealed that fifty percent of all patent
applications cited no prior art at all. Mr. Aharonian similarly estimates that somewhere
between fifty percent and seventy percent of software patents would likely not issue if the
examiners were to conduct prior art searches of both Patent Office archives and databases
that are readily available but not accessible within the confines of the Patent Office.").
7. See Quillen & Webster, supra note 1, at 13 ("From the foregoing, it is evident that
the examination of patent applications by the PTO [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office] is
significantly less rigorous than is the examination of patent applications by the EPO
[European Patent Office], the JPO [Japan Patent Office], or the GPO [Germany Patent
Office]. Also, the likelihood of ultimately obtaining allowance of a patent application
from the PTO is far higher than in the EPO, the JPO, or the GPO.").
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free from political influence.8 Powerful pressure groups exert their
influence over the Patent Office either directly or indirectly by
influencing policymakers in Congress to shape patent policy
according to their preferences.9 Third, laws and regulations grant the
Patent Office an incentive structure that may adversely affect its
performance. 0 The Patent Office is rewarded with a fee for each
granted patent, without incurring any penalties for granting wrong
ones.1 Furthermore, the Patent Office knows that it does not have
the final word regarding a granted patent. If it grants a "bad" patent,
courts may examine and revoke its validity, but there is no direct
penalty or consequence to the Patent Office for its mistakes. 2
Adding to the Patent Office's problems is the fact that, in recent
years, the patent system has undergone important changes. Most of
the patents granted recently belong to high technology and Internet
areas, which are not the traditional areas for patenting. 3 Moreover,
because the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed for the
patenting of business methods in the case State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,4 which was followed by a
subsequent retreat in In re Bilski, 5 the Patent Office had to adapt to
new areas that became eligible for patenting. 6 The Patent Office had
no experience in granting these types of patents, 7 and therefore,

8. See Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1021-23 (2004) (describing the influence of lawyers and
inventors on the Patent Office).
9. See Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REV. 337, 339-42 (2004)
(explaining the political determinants of the U.S. patent system characteristics).
10. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 65-66 (describing how the regulations affect
the performance of the Patent Office).
11. Id.
12. See Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker, supra note 1, at 733 ("In
contrast to our surgeon, the USPTO bears no responsibility for allowing an invalid patent
to issue. Courts do not fine the USPTO upon invalidating a patent; the examiners who
allowed the case are not disciplined for their oversight; nor must the USPTO award
damages to affected members of the public to compensate for an improvidently granted
patent. The costs of failing to acquire information are simply shifted to the other actorsin particular, the federal courts, the patentee's competitors, and, ultimately, the
consumers.").
13. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN

1 (2003), available at http:/lwww.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2l/stratplan-03feb2003.
pdf (discussing the growth in patent and trademark applications during the last decade and
the need to address this increase in demand).
14. 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
15. 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
16. See Baird, supra note 1, at 347-48.
17. Id. at 355.
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their chances of making mistakes were higher. New technological

advances, the changes in the types of patents granted, and the Patent
Office's incentive structure have all contributed to increasing the
errors of the Patent Office.

The rise in errors has led to more

dissatisfaction with the current regime.
The existence of wrongly-granted patents and the general

problems facing the patent system generate significant economic
costs. 1 8 Many companies are forced to resort to court action to
invalidate patents granted to competitors. 9 The costs of patent
litigation are very high and impose important welfare costs, such as

increasing transaction costs in technology markets, on businesses, and
on the economy.20 However, even when companies can choose to go
to the courts to challenge a patent, the cost of paying a license or
reaching a private agreement usually is lower than the cost of

litigation. 21 Thus, improvidently granted patents then survive in the
market, creating incentives for aggressive patenting. As a result, the
Patent Office is presumably inundated with patent applications,
which hurts the agency's efficiency.22 Private firms will behave

Another problem at the USPTO that has increased the difficulty in examining
business method patent applications is the lack of examiners with backgrounds in
business and business methods. Typically, examiners have expertise in technical
fields such as engineering or biotechnology; however, they often lack business
backgrounds and knowledge. The USPTO has been slow to hire examiners with
business backgrounds despite the large increase in business method patent
applications.
Id.
18. See Hall & Harhoff, supra note 2, at 992-94 (analyzing the impact of low quality
patents on the economy).
19. Note, Estopping the Madness at the PTO: Improving Patent Administration
Through ProsecutionHistory Estoppel, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2164, 2165 (2003).
20. Id. ("[P]oor patent quality creates uncertainty over patent validity. This
uncertainty increases transaction costs in licensing negotiations because parties must
conduct duplicative research and prior art searches to determine if a particular patent is
valid and worth licensing. Finally, by postponing the true validity determination until
litigation, poor patent quality strains judicial resources.").
21. Id. "Bad patents can also lead to holdup licensing, whereby patentees license bad
patents to many parties for low royalties, knowing that most licensees would rather just
pay the fee than become embroiled in expensive patent litigation." Id.
22. Hall & Harhoff, supra note 2, at 995.
Since the mid-1980s, utility patent applications to the USPTO have grown at an
average rate of five percent per year, rising from approximately 100,000 per year
from 1970 through 1984, to about 330,000 per year in 2001. Obviously, this
increase has led to an increase in patent office workload, especially since resources
at the patent office have not kept pace. Patent pendency has risen from an
average of eighteen months in 1990 to twenty-four months in 2002. There is
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strategically by obtaining a diverse set of patents to improve their
market competitiveness. They would then have the advantage of
developing their inventions and delaying the investing processes of
their competitors.
In light of the problems facing the patent system, an important
debate has emerged concerning the changes needed to improve
patenting proficiency.
However, most of the discussions and
proposals about patent reform neglect the political nature of the
patent system and the role of political institutions in the reform.
This Article studies the political economy of patent system
reform. The first Part of this Article shows that patent reform is
shaped by the preferences of different interest groups with a stake in
the patent system. The Article then analyzes how diverse economic
and political groups with a stake in the functioning of the patent
system influence and shape congressional legislation and determine
the direction and scope of the proposed reforms. Next, the Article
considers five main actors in the patent system: (1) inventors
(individuals, universities, and all firms/corporations); (2) the Patent
Office; and the Patent Bar, which we divide among (3) prosecutors;
(4) litigators; and (5) the courts. As Part I shows, the specific
legislative preferences of these groups will determine the fate of
proposed reforms to the patent regime. More importantly, Part I
explains how these groups try to shape legislation in their favor or
block specific reforms not in their favor, why Congress has failed to
introduce comprehensive reforms to the patent system, and what the
key factors are that will influence future patent reform.
The second Part of this Article analyzes the vote in the House of
Representatives in favor of the Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R.
1908. By performing a logistic regression, we show that the passage
of this bill in the House was strongly correlated to the resources that
the primary stakeholders provided to each of the congressional
representatives.
In the third Part, we present two case studies based on the
implications of our model by examining the outcome of two proposed
reforms contained in the Patent Reform Act of 2007. One case study
refers to the establishment of a post-grant examination system within
the Patent Office; the other case study examines many of the other
reforms proposed in the patent reform bill introduced in Congress in
evidence that patent grant rates have also risen, suggesting that time pressures
have led to less scrutiny of each individual application.
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2007. As Part III shows, the preferences of these actors are key to
understanding the failure or success of these reforms. We find that
several actors have a strong influence on the proposed reforms of the
patent system, and that the success of such reforms will be linked to
the strength of these groups in Congress. As a result, one should
think of patent reform not merely in substantive terms, but as a
political economy issue as well.
I. POLITICAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

According to the literature of New Institutional economics,
formal and informal institutions are designed to reduce transaction
costs in the economy. 23 Consequently, economic growth will be

maximized in societies where institutions minimize transaction costs
and foster market exchange.24 In particular, well-defined and well-

enforced property rights are some of the main instruments to
minimize transaction costs, because the holders of property rights can
readily dispose of their assets into the most productive activities. In
any given market or technology, there will be an optimal level of
property rights protection. In the case of patents, a balance should

exist between the social cost of the patentee's monopoly over the
invention and the dynamic gains in innovation that arise from the
patentee's disclosure.26 On the other hand, uncertainty and the high
costs of enforcing property rights induce high levels of wasted

resources spent validating the property rights of an asset, thereby
reducing the level of investment in innovations. 7 In this framework,
23.

DOUGLASS

C. NORTH,

INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 66--67 (1990). "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more

In
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or
economic." Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 8.
Traditional economic analysis of market functioning does not include property
rights issues such as enforcement or property rights definition. Generally,
transactions costs are neglected and then market results are perfectly efficient.
Besides, the importance of the political process that give shape to market
regulation and property rights are not taken into account.
Id.
25. See id. at 27-35.
26. See Nancy Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from U.S. Recent Patent
Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131,132 (2002).
27. NORTH, supra note 23, at 58. "The more resources that must be devoted to
transacting to assure cooperative outcomes, the more diluted are the gains from trade of
the neoclassical model. The more complex the exchange in time and space, the more
complex and costly are the institutions necessary to realize cooperative outcomes." Id.
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the design and the functioning of a patent system, together with the
enforcement mechanisms needed to sustain it, are key to fostering
innovation and investment in new technologies.
The design of a patent system, like any other formal institution,
depends not only on objective technical or scientific characteristics
that will promote optimal efficiency, but also on the political
preferences of the economic actors with a stake in the matter to be
regulated. As a result, the definition and enforcement of property
rights will depend on the political strength of these economic actors
and their respective preferences. Because of the political nature of
the property rights regime, the resulting regulatory framework will
also depend on the political institutions in place. These institutions
are the specific political instruments stakeholders have to influence
changes according to their preferences. 28 In the case of patents,
political institutions are shaped by the rules and procedures of
Congress, where patent legislation is designed and passed. The
economic agents with a stake in the patent system approach
congresspersons in their respective congressional committees to
influence the results of the proposed reforms.29 We assume the
political institutions are a given, and we focus on how these actors act
to influence Congress to pass or block patent legislation according to
their preferences.
First, we must determine the specific preferences for each
stakeholder. We analyze the relationship between the economic
results of the patent system and the political forces that determine the
changes in the regime to determine each actor's preferences. Figure
1, below, shows how the patent regime works. Congress is in charge
of enacting the laws that define and regulate the patent system.3 ° The
system is formed by a set of rules that provide a given protection of
property rights to inventors.3' Accordingly, Congress created the

28. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2234-39 (2000) (describing the importance of
lobbying on Congress regarding patent law issues).
29. Id. at 2235. "Copyright interest groups hold fund raisers for members of
Congress, write campaign songs, invite members of Congress (and their staff) to private
movie screenings or sold out concerts, and draft legislation they expect Congress to pass
without any changes." Id. (quoting William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative
Process: A PersonalPerspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996)).

30. U.S. CONsT. art. I., § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have the Power .... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
31. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
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Patent Office to review and grant patents for inventions.32 This
potential monopoly power,33 even if it increases transaction costs for
the users of the technology, could also generate incentives for further
investments in new technologies from the owner of the patent and
other inventors. 34 The incentives for future innovations, however, will
depend on the specific technology to be patented. Patent owners'
competitors in the same economic sector will be worse off because of
the monopoly. For many of them, efforts to obtain the patent failed,
or they were defeated by the patentee in the patent race. Users will
have to pay licenses to the owner of the patent, increasing the cost of
using a given technology.36 In the case of a patent that was
improvidently granted, these negative effects-that is, the market
losses-would be greater because there is no new invention, just
wrongly granted property rights.37 These patents have an impact on
markets and on the economy in general, resulting in gains for some
groups and losses for others.38
The actors affected by these economic consequences will resort
to their political influence in two different ways. Losers will use the
political system to change the rules and reverse the negative
economic results, while winners will resort to similar political
influence in an attempt to sustain the status quo of the patent
system. 39 These groups can influence both the Patent Office and
Congress, through its committees, to obtain better mechanisms to
claim new patents or to improve the functioning of the system in their
32. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Our Business: An Introduction to
the USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2009)
[hereinafter Intro to USPTO].
33. HALL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 233 (3d ed. 1992) ("The word
monopoly originally meant the right of exclusive sale. It has come to be used to describe

any situation in which some firm or small group of firms has the exclusive control of a
product in a given market.... The relevant feature of a monopolist from the viewpoint of
economic analysis is that a monopolist has market power in the sense that the amount of
output that it is able to sell responds continuously as a function of the price it charges.").
34. Gallini, supra note 26, at 136.
35. Id. at 139 (analyzing the different incentives and disincentives to investment the
patent system induced on specific sectors).
36. See id. at 137.
37. See Kesan, supra note 1, at 767-68 (analyzing the impact of wrongly granted
patents).
38. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law-Balancing Profit Maximization and

Public Access to Technology, 4 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2002),
http://www.stlr.org/html/volume4/beckermanintro.php (describing the impact of patents
on markets and society).
39. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 28, at 2236-37 (discussing lobbying efforts securing
passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act of 1998, which dramatically
increased protections afforded to current copyright owners).
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favor. As such, the patent system is not permanently settled but
subject to changes due to the interaction between and among the
different actors with a stake in the patent system: inventors, the
Patent Office, patent lawyers, and the courts. These groups must also
contend with Congress' committees, because Congress is the
institution in charge of solving the political struggle.
Figure 1

Figure2

Given these characteristics of the patent system and the
economic results the system creates, these groups will organize into
more structured political groups to influence how the patent system
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will operate. As shown by Figure 1, pressure groups can apply
political pressure directly on the Patent Office or indirectly through
Inventors can be classified into different groups:
Congress.
individuals, universities, and firms or industries. However, their stake
in the patent regime can vary due to several factors;4" therefore,
individuals, universities, and firms or industries will have different
preferences. We assume that individual inventors prefer a strong
patent system that protects their inventions against corporations and
allows them to profit from their inventions. Universities share some
common interests with individual inventors, because their discoveries
are also protected through the patent system.41 Firm or industry
preferences depend on other factors, such as type of technology and
market power (size).
Figure 2, above, shows the classification of inventors based on
type of organization, the technological characteristics of their
inventions, and market power or size. While individual inventors
depend on the strength of the patent system to reap benefits from
their invention efforts, corporations may or may not benefit from a
strong patent system. On the one hand, bigger corporations, like
Microsoft and IBM, have enough economic resources to protect their
technology without having to resort to the patent system.42 On the
40. See Gallini, supra note 26, at 139.
41. See Letter from Ass'n of Am. Univs., Am. Council on Educ., Ass'n. of Am. Med.
Coils. & Council on Governmental Relations, to Lamar Smith & Howard Berman,
Members of Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. (June 23,
at
http://www.acenet.edu/AM/Template.Cfm?Section=Home&
2005),
available
CONTENTID=10758&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
Although the principal means by which university research results are
disseminated is through peer-reviewed publications, conferences, and other forms
of open communication, the nation also benefits substantially from university
research through technology transfer processes where fundamental discoveries are
moved into the commercial sector for development into useful products. The
landmark 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which authorized universities and small businesses
to retain patent and licensing rights to inventions resulting from federally funded
research, has been an extraordinarily successful mechanism for facilitating the
transfer of basic discoveries into the commercial sector for development. The
patent system is an integral part of this process.
Id.
42. A good example of the formation of these lobby groups is the Information
Technology Industry Council. See Information Technology Industry Council, 2009
Member Companies, http:/lwww.itic.org/index.php?submenu=Who&submenu=Who&src=
gendocs&ref=membercompanies&category=whoweare (last visited Apr. 30, 2009). The
members of this Council are well-known companies: Accenture, Agilent Technologies,
AMD, Apple, Applied Materials, Cannon USA, Cisco Systems, Corning, Dell, Eastman
Kodak, eBay, EMC, Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell, IBM, Intel, Lexmark International,
Micron, Microsoft, National Semiconductor, NRC Corporation, Oracle, Panasonic,
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other hand, small companies or individuals can harass these large
companies if they hold the patent to a specific component that the
bigger companies use in developing new products by withholding the
patent or demanding excessive license fees for its use.43 The existence
of numerous patents of this type has brought complaints from the
software industry about "patent trolls."'
In many cases, small
companies' competitiveness depends on their ability to patent some
innovation and obtain royalties from bigger companies.
Consequently, the smaller the company, the higher their preference is
likely to be for a strong patent system.
Figure 2 also illustrates that the type of technology a company
produces will determine its stance toward the patent system.4 5 Hightechnology sectors, like computer software and web-based
technologies, prefer a weaker patent system with weaker injunctive
relief instead of a traditional, conventional property rights-based
patent system. This preference results from these companies' reliance
on non-patent mechanisms (such as network effects or first-mover
Qualcomm, SAP, Sony electronics, Sun Microsystems, Symbol Technologies, Tektronic,
Time Warner, Unisys, and VeriSign. Id. Another example is the Business Software
Alliance, whose members are among some of the most recognized companies: Adobe,
Autodesk, Avid, Bentley, Borland, Mastercam, Intelligent Security Systems, Macromedia,
McAfee, Cadence, Cisco Systems, Dell, Entrust, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Intel, RSA,
Microsoft, PTC, Solid Works, Sybase, Symantec, The MathWorks, UGS, Veritas, and
SAP. Business Software Alliance, http://www.bsa.org/country/BSA%20and%2OMembers/
Our%2OMembers.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
43. Maggie Shiels, Technology Industry Hits Out at "PatentTrolls," BBC NEWS, June
2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3722509.stm.
44. Id. ("These are lawyers and investors who buy cheaply or assume control over
paper patents, mistakenly granted largely to failed companies, explains David Simon,
computer firm Intel's chief patent counsel. The trolls can use these patents to threaten to
shut down the entire computing industry with a court order injunction, no matter how
minor the feature that has been patented is. Mr. Simon cites one case where a patent troll
claimed a patent they had bought for about $50,000 was infringed by all of Intel's
microprocessors from the Pentium II onwards and that they were seeking $7 billion in
damages. In the end, the case was thrown out by the court, but it still cost Intel $3m to
fight it, Mr. Simon says.").
45. See Gallini, supra note 26, at 144.
The relationship between patents and innovation is at least as complex as the
profile of technological and economic factors that determine innovation. There is
no simple or universal correlation between the availability of patents and the
incentive to innovate. This is due in part to the fact that the patent system
interacts with industries at several different points in the innovation process.
Recent evidence has demonstrated that this complex relationship is also industryspecific at each stage of the patent process: deciding to seek protection, obtaining
a patent, setting the scope of the patent that results, deciding to enforce a patent,
and determining litigation outcomes.
Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1589 (2003).
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advantage) to appropriate benefits from their innovation and from
the fact that the usefulness of their new technologies is limited to a
few years, if not months. For example, information technology
companies may prefer a system in which property rights are not as
well-defined instead of a strict patent system that does not allow for
flexibility in creating new technologies.4 6 Therefore, such companies
will oppose reinforcing and strengthening the current patent regime.4 7
Other sectors, for example, biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies, which depend heavily on patents to support their R&D
projects and sustain their market positions, will prefer a strong patent

system to foster market value for their innovations.48 Furthermore,
these pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies may also use

their patents in an offensive role as an instrument to stave off
competition from smaller companies.
Based on these varying preferences within firms and industries,
we arrive at four different types of net payoff functions:49 (1) big

companies in technology sectors that oppose a stronger patent
system, such as those in the information technology sector; (2) big
companies in other technological sectors supporting more secure
definition and enforcement of patents, such as pharmaceutical and

biotechnology companies; (3) small firms in the information
technology sector that may or may not prefer a higher degree of
property rights protection; and (4) small firms in the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology sectors that may or may not prefer a weaker
46. See generally Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in
the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the impacts of broad and
narrow software patent systems on the software industry).
47. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1687-88 ("While most biotechnological and
chemical inventions require broad patent protection because of their high cost and
uncertain development process, the opposite is true in the case of software development.
Software inventions tend to have a quick, cheap, and fairly straightforward post-invention
development cycle. Most of the work in software development occurs in the initial coding,
not in the development or production. The lead time to market in the software industry
tends to be short. The capital investment requirement for software development is
relatively low-mostly consisting of hiring personnel, not building laboratories or
manufacturing infrastructure. Debugging and test marketing is tedious and potentially
time consuming, but it does not rival the cost of stringent safety testing and agency
oversight that is necessary in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.").
48. A good example of the power of this lobby group is Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA"), which represents the most important companies
in the pharmaceutical sector.
See PhRMA
Member
Company List,
http://www.phrma.org/whoweare/members/memlist.phtml?mbrType=members#members
ListStart (last visited Apr. 30, 2009) (providing a comprehensive list of PhRMA
members).
49. A net payoff function represents the net benefit that an agent receives from
different variables that directly affect its benefit.
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definition of property rights. As a result, business alliances for or
against patent system reform will take shape across these dimensions
of companies' technologies and economic strength. Given this
information, Figure 2 can be modified to include these four categories

of companies:
Figure3

SIndividuals and Universities

Big IT Companies

InventorS
Corporations

Big Pharma and Biotech
Companies
SmallI IT C ompanies
Small Pharma and Biotech

I

Companies

Figure 3 shows that inventors' "pressure groups" will try to

influence the Patent Office directly to change the system.50 More
importantly, these groups will also try to influence congressional
legislative reforms in an attempt to shape the patent regime according
to their preferences. For example, the Patent Office has a Patent
Public

Advisory

Committee,

which

generates

policy

recommendations for the agency." Firms, lawyers, and independent
inventors that have an important role and interest in the
characteristics of the patent system compose this committee. 2 The

50. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 1038 ("[Als reflected by the evidence[,] ... the USPTO
apparently sees its mission as serving its 'customers,' namely patent applicants. This
concern is heightened by evidence that the USPTO issues patents for a very high fraction
of patent applications.... For example, the governance of the USPTO could be changed
so that consumer interests were better represented, or the incentives facing USPTO
management could be redesigned to place much greater weight on patent quality.").
51. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Public Advisory Committee,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
52. PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,

ANNUAL REPORT 3-4 (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/advisory/acrobat/ppacannualll-30-01.pdf. According to the Patent Public Advisory
Committee's 2001 Annual Report, the members of the Committee were: Margaret A.
Boulware (Chair) (Jenkens & Gilchrist, Houston, Texas), James L. Fergason
(Independent Inventor, Redwood City, California), Ronald E. Myrick (Chief Intellectual
Property Counsel, General Electric Co., Weston, Connecticut), Gerald Mossinghoff
(Senior Counsel, Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, Arlington, Virginia),
Katherine E. White (Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University, Detroit,
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Patent Office is well aware of the preferences of industries and
inventors, because they constitute their customer base. As the
Commissioner of the Patent Office expressed in 1996, "[t]he focus of
this entire reengineering effort is on the customer as a full partner in
the process. To support this commitment, we have embarked upon a
series of roundtable discussions with our customers to learn their
interests and concerns, and to seek their input on reengineering
53
plans.
Accordingly, the Patent Office's main objective is to design an
efficient system to fulfill customers' demands.5 4 However, the
definition of "customer" is limited to industries and inventors, even
though the patent system has an impact on consumers and citizens as
well. 5 By granting new patents, the Patent Office not only affects the
investment strategy of some firms and inventors, but it also shapes
market structure, as Figure 1 illustrates. Furthermore, the Patent
Office, as with any government agency, has its own preferences
concerning revenue and performance.5 6 Because of its unique
position as manager of the patent system, the agency has an
important role in advising Congress on new legislation.
Congress, however, does not rely exclusively on advice from the
Patent Office. As Figure 1 shows, Congress is also directly influenced
by pressure groups. Legislators whose constituencies have interests in
Michigan), and Vernon A. Norviel (General Counsel and Secretary, Perlegen Sciences,
Inc., San Jose, California). PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra.
53. Patent System and Modern Technology Needs: Meeting the Challenge of the 21st
Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology of the H. Comm. on Science, 104th
Cong. 11 (1996) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks).
54. Intro to USPTO, supra note 32.
The USPTO mission is to ensure that the intellectual property system contributes
to a strong global economy, encourages investment in innovation, and fosters
entrepreneurial spirit.
The USPTO promotes industrial and technological
progress in the United States and strengthens the national economy by:
"

Administeringthe laws relatingto patents and trademarks.

"

Advising the Secretary of Commerce, the President of the United States,
and the administrationon patent, trademark,and copyrightprotection.

"

Advising the Secretary of Commerce, the President of the United States,

and the Administration on the trade-related aspects of intellectual
property.

Id.
55. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 13, at 2 ("Our products and
services will be tailored to meet the needs of customers.").
56. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 66-67.
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the design of the patent system usually occupy positions on the House

and Senate committees involved in patent legislation, a phenomenon
displayed below in Table 1. The states represented in this
subcommittee obtained seventy percent of all the patents granted in
the United States from 1996 to 2007.17
Table 1: Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Property
House of Representatives, 107th and 110th Congress58
Ses

10ats

Se
107h 10th

California
North Carolina
Illinois
Virginia
Tennessee
Utah
South Carolina
Alabama
Indiana
Florida
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
New York
Texas
Ohio
Georgia

5
1
1
2
1
1
1

6
2
2
1
1

1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1

1
3
1
1
1
2
2
1

Patents
1996-2007
208,280
20,405
39,951
12,417
8,690
7,793
6,267
4,211
15,562
29,430
36,961
42,517
40,910
19,283
68,626
67,919
35,040
15,189

Percentage of Total

U.S. Patents

1996-2007
21.6
2.1
4.1
1.3
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.4
1.6
3.1
3.8
4.4
4.2
2.0
7.1
7.1
3.6
1.6

57. See infra note 58.
58. See LORRAINE C. MILLER, CLERK OF THE H.R., LIST OF STANDING COMMS. &
SELECT COMMS. & THEIR SUBCOMMS. OF THE H.R. OF THE U.S. TOGETHER WITH J.
COMMS. OF THE CONG. WITH AN ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THE MEMBERS & THEIR
COMM. ASSIGNMENTS, ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONG. (2009),
available at
http://clerk.house.gov/110/scsfinalll0.pdf; PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTS BY COUNTRY, STATE, & YEAR-UTILITY
PATENTS (DECEMBER 2007), http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cst_utl.htm; JEFF TRANDAHL,
CLERK OF THE H.R., LIST OF STANDING COMM. & SELECT COMMS. & THEIR
SUBCOMMS. OF THE H.R. OF THE U.S. TOGETHER WITH J. COMMS. OF THE CONG. WITH
AN ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THE MEMBERS & THEIR COMM. ASSIGNMENTS, ONE

HUNDRED SEVENTH CONG. (2002), available at http://clerk.house.gov/107/scsfinall07.pdf.
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The Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Property in the House of Representatives was mostly dominated by
states with high inventive activity. Table 1 shows that California, with
nearly twenty percent of total patents granted from 1996 to 2007, has
six seats in the subcommittee during the 110th Congress, the most of
any state.
Besides inventors and the Patent Office, patent lawyers (both
patent litigators and prosecutors) and the courts round out the
important players in the patent system. Prosecution and litigation are
two of the main services that law firms in the patent arena offer to
patentees and patent litigants. The efficiency of the patent system
depends on the low cost and accuracy of these services. Furthermore,
the design of the patent system gives lawyers the opportunity to profit
from their services. Consequently, members of the bar are a very
well-organized group that tries to influence patent legislation in
Congress.
The courts, too, are important players in the patent system. In
contrast to inventors and lawyers, the courts are not organized as a
pressure group, but instead serve as a check on the system and on
Congress through their decisions and verdicts. Moreover, the courts
do not have a typical economic stake in the performance of the patent
system as do inventors, the Patent Office, and patent lawyers. As a
result, we assume that the courts prefer a system that maximizes
quality and performance in correctly assigning property rights.
A.

Analyzing Stakeholders

Among the different groups of inventors and lawyers, each
exercises a different measure of strength in putting pressure on
Congress; therefore, their influence on congressional members varies.
To measure each group's importance in Congress, we analyzed how
much money these groups spent on lobbying, and inferentially, how
important the issues of patent protection were in their agendas.
Table 2 shows the breakdown of inventors and lawyers into eight
groups and the associations and main actors within each group.
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Table 2: Main Stakeholders59
Group
Big Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Companies
Small Pharmaceutical
Companies
Big Information
Technology Companies

Associations and Main Actors
PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America), BIO (Biotechnology
Industry Organization)
Generic Pharmaceutical Association
BSA (Business Software Alliance), ITIC
(Information Technology Industry Council), CCIA
(Computer and Communications Industry
Association)

Small Information
Technology Companies
Prosecutors(APA
Litigators
Universities
Individual Inventors

American Intellectual Property Law Association
(AIPLA)

American Intellectual Property Law Association
(AIPLA), Bar Associations
AAU (Association of American Universities)
Professional Inventors Alliance USA, NAPP
(National Association of Patent Practitioners)

Table 3, below, specifies the amount of money spent on all
lobbying efforts in each sector, not accounting for market power
within firms or industries, or differences between public and private
universities. As Table 3 shows, pharmaceutical companies are the
largest spenders on lobbying, although the amount of money spent by
the computer industry has grown more rapidly in the last seven years.
Universities also show a substantial increase in the amount of money
they devote to lobbying. The slowest growth in expenditures is in law
associations. Despite the increasing amount of money spent on
lobbying by the computer industry and universities, the
pharmaceutical sector represents fifty-one percent of the total
amount paid among all these groups. The computer sector represents
twenty-five percent, while universities represent twenty percent of the
total. Besides the important growth in the amount of money devoted
to lobbying, the number of companies or institutions lobbying inside
each sector also grew. In this case, it is the computer sector that leads

59. These actors are just examples, and the list is not exhaustive. Large
are those that have brand name recognition and wide market presence in
information technology or pharmaceutical sector. Small companies are
operation in small, specific markets, without a general brand name. The other
participants with an interest in patent protection.

companies
either the
those that
groups are
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the growth rate, with a 229% increase in the number of companies
lobbying Congress.
Table 3: Lobby Expenditures by Main Groups'
(Millions of Dollars and Number of Participantsfrom Each Industry)
Percent
Increase
1998 1999 2000
Pharma.
Number

2001

2002

2003

2004

237

233

245

284

334

Computer 39.40 45.15 54.40

64.85

68.02

77.04

86.09

Number
Univ.
Number
Law
Assoc.
Number

2005

2006 .... 2007

72.37 82.09 92.72 100.82 129.33 127.55 142.85 166.99 183.52 228.33
181

131

222

215.5

485

168.0

92.33 108.35 112.88

186.5

417

446

226

223

243

288

314

387

407

431

229.0

30.80 36.47 46.48

57.22

66.78

73.80

79.01

88.80

89.06

90.23

193.0

362

184

20072007

468

587

702

787

815

894

893

882

143.6

16.69 14.09 13.95
88
98
95

401

11.98

15.04

29.27

23.26

23.78

25.21

19.21

15.1

97

98

108

116

122

121

118

34.1

Nonetheless, despite the fact that the more money a sector pays,
the greater the influence they will have on Congress, not all this
lobbying money is devoted to property rights and patent issues. As
shown in Table 4, if one looks at how patent and property rights
issues are ranked for each sector, the computer sector leads, followed
by pharmaceuticals, law associations, and universities. As a result,
even though universities spend a significant amount of money on
lobbying, property protection is very low on their list of priorities. As
such, they are not going to devote a large amount of resources to this
issue. The computer and pharmaceutical sectors, on the other hand,
devote more of their resources to patent and property rights issues
than the other sectors.

60. OpenSecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database, http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/top.php?indexType=i (last visited Apr. 30, 2009) (select relevant industry and click
on individual institutions).
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Table 461
Sector

Rank of Patent and
Copyright Issues 2006

Pharmaceuticals
Computer
Universities
Law Associations

7
6
11
21

Percentage of Total Filings
Regarding Patent and Copyright
Issues 2006
4.8
5.3
1.6
1.4

Among the most important players to lobby in the patent and
copyright arena are pharmaceutical and computer companies; they
appear near the top of the list of all sectors interested in patent and
copyright policy, as indicated in Table 5. Among these sectors, the
top fifteen account for eighty-six percent of all patent and copyright
filings for the period 2003-2004.
Table 5: Top 15 IndustrialSectors with an Interest in Patent and
Copyright Policy, 2003-200462
Number of Filings
Television, Movie & Music Production

258

Percentage of
Filings
21.4

Computer Equipment & Services

200

16.6

Pharmaceuticals & Other Health Products
Printing & Publishing Industries
Private Schools, Colleges and Universities,
Education Groups & Related Organizations
Business Associations
Public Schools, Colleges and Universities

149

12.3

80
48

6.6
4.0

44

3.6

42

3.5

Retail Sales
Beer, Wine & Liquor Industries
Telecommunications Services & Equipment
Non-Profit Institutions & Organizations
Miscellaneous Communications & Electronics

40
31

3.3
2.6

28

2.3

28

2.3

26

2.2

_Total

61. Authors' own elaboration based on data from www.publicintegrity.org. The data
in this Table does not correspond to data currently found on the website, but the authors
have informed the editors that the Table reflects the numbers as they appeared in May
2008, when the authors accessed the website. This and other data used by the authors in
this Article is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
62. Center for Public Integrity, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/lobby/profile.aspx?
act=issues&year=2003&is=CPT&sub=6 (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
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Electronics Manufacturing & Services

23

Percentage of
Total Filings
1.9

Miscellaneous Manufacturing and Distributing
Telephone Utilities

22

1.8

20

1.7

Total

1,208

If we eliminate the copyright-related sectors and focus only on
the issues of interest to the Patent Office, the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology sectors represented 17.8% of the total patent filings for
2003-2004, the computer sector represented 5%, universities made up
2.8%, law associations represented 4.4%, other property rights
associations added up to 5.5%, and other sectors were at 45%.63 The
most important companies in the "other" category are publishers and
the media organizations, which are more concerned about copyright
protection than the patent system. As a result, we omit these actors
from our analysis and focus on the main actors with an interest in the
reform of the patent system. Furthermore, Table 6 shows the number
and percentage of reports submitted to Congress with respect to
property rights and patents. As shown in Table 6, the computer and
pharmaceutical sectors are the two most important sectors with an
interest in this issue.
Table 6: Number of Reports on Property Rights and Patents
(Most Important Sectors, 2007) 4
Percentage of Total
Reports
18.5

Computer, Software, Internet
Pharmaceutical - Health
Media - Communications - Publishing
Universities
Patent Associations

226

84
33

27.3
19.4
6.9
2.7

Other Sectors
Law Firms and Associations

280
28

22.9
2.3

Total

1,221

333
237

63. Id.
64. Authors' own elaboration based on data from wwwopensecrets.org. The data in
this Table does not correspond to data currently found on the website, but the authors
have informed the editors that the Table reflects the numbers as they appeared in May
2008 when the authors accessed the website. This, and other, data used by the authors in
this Article is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

1362

[Vol. 87

Looking closer at each of the main groups that contribute money
to lobbying activities, we find that the main contributors are the
biggest companies in each sector. According to Table 7, in the case of
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, PhRMA is the leading
actor, with the largest amount of money spent on lobbying. Most of
the top contributors in this section can be classified as big
companies.65 All companies that devote the most money to lobbying
are big companies, which then have an important advantage over
small companies. The only actor representative of small laboratories,
the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, ranked thirty-sixth in 2007,
with approximately $1.1 million spent on lobbying.66 Furthermore,
counting the total money spent by PhRMA and its member
companies reveals that they account for sixty percent of the total
amount spent on lobbying in 2007.67
Table 7: Top Ten 2007 Contributorsof Money for Lobbying
Within the Pharmaceuticaland Biotechnology Sectors
(Millions of Dollars)6"
Percent

0

1998 1999 2000 2001

2003 2

2005

2

2007 Growth

X
X

13.8

516.1

X

0.99

8.24

164.1

X

5.38

5.38

7.7

387.3

X

5.18

5.82

5.46

7.16

321.2

X

2.57

2.91

3.86

5.68

7.12

7020.0

X

3.2

3.14

4.43

6.67

6.45

283.9

X

3.22

2.95

3.6

3.77

4.2

6.16

431.0

X

4.9

5.32

5.58

5.04

5.74

5.66

100.7

X

7.48 11.28
2.68 3.08

2.24

3.44

3.57

4.7

3.72

5.66

6.49

11.8

3.12

2.74

1.5

4.54

4.1

2.9

4.9

4.86

1.58

1.56

2.78

3.24

3.76

4.34

4.78

1.7

2.56

2.86

3.51

3.54

4.26

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.22

1.68

1.91

2.42

2.98

2.57

1.16

1.78

2.7

2.6

2.82

3.62

4.66

4.86

3.12
2.36

Roche
Group
Novartis
AG
BristolMyers

Aventis

Big

Comp.

628.5
589.0

14.26 16.04 15.52 13.48 18.1 22.73
2.94 4.96 4.96 5.72 10.22 16.26

5.02
3.44

PhRMA
Amgen
Inc
Pfizer
Inc
Glaxo
Smith
Kline
Johnson
&
Johnson
Biotechnology
Indus.
Org.
Sanofi-

Squibb

2002

IIII1

See Figure 3, supra.
OpenSecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database Pharmaceuticals/Health Products,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=H04&year=2007
(last
Apr. 30, 2009).
67. Id.
68. See id. (to find all data, click on each respective year).

65.
66.
2007,
visited
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Table 8 shows that, in the case of the computer and information
technology sectors, the top contributors are also the biggest
companies and associations in the sector. Nonetheless, Table 8
illustrates that the top ten percent of the lobbying companies
represent just thirty-seven percent of the total money spent in
lobbying in 2007, while they represented fifty-seven percent in 1998.
As a result, given the increase in the number of companies and
associations lobbying for the information technology sector, there is
less concentration in the source of the money for lobbying. The same
pattern occurs in Table 8 with the top twenty percent of the lobbying

companies.
Table 8: Top Ten 2007 Contributorsof Money for Lobbying
Within the Computerand Information Technology Sectors
(Millions of Dollars)6 9
Percent

Big

140.6

X

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Growth Comp.
Microsoft
Corp

3.74

4.66

6.36

6.56

6.50

8.74

IBM Corp

5.31

6.14

4.68

4.97

5.05

7.16

6.54 7.18

7.54

7.92

49.1

X

2.58

1.73

2.73

2.87

3.06

5.28

177.9

X

0.24

0.18 0.32

0.80

1.38

4.33

2787.9

X

5.12

3.11

2.77

2.72

3.87

3.67

11.0

X

0.96

1.76 2.06

2.31

2.85

197.7

X

2.30

2.76

22.1

X

Oracle Corp

1.90

2.28

3.30

2.86

Entertainment
Software Assn
Texas
Te
ts
Instruments
eBay Inc
HewlettPackard
Earthlink Inc
Top 10
P e r ce n t
Top 20
Percent

2.27

0.15

SAP America
EDSCorp

2.18

2.26

5.56

2.69

9.46

8.70 8.88

9.00

1.91

2.20

2.09

2.60

0.07

0.27

0.31

0.60 0.56 0.64
0.62 1.06 1.23

1.00 1.97

2.11
1.98

2750.7
224.6

X
X

0.04
51.9

0.36 0.36 0.36 0.61 1.87
48.8 44.9 41.0 39.0 39.5

1.85
37.0

X

50.0

0.12
56.9

4525.0

57.2
74.6

67.2

62.2

67.4

59.6

51.5

0.61

1.74 2.12

2.20

I_1
56.4

53.2

50.0 52.6

69. OpenSecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database Computers/Internet,
http://www.opensecrets.orglobby/indusclient.php?year=2007&lname=B12&id=
visited Apr. 30, 2009) (to find all data, click on each respective year).

___

2007,
(last
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In the case of universities, both public and private, the amount of

money is more evenly distributed.7" Furthermore, given their
structure and similar activities, universities are more homogeneous in
their interests compared to the other groups. Finally, as for law
organizations, only the American Bar Association has ranked patent

and copyright issues on its list of interests.
Table 9: Top Ten 2007 Contributorsof Money for Lobbying Within
Law Organizations
(Millions of Dollars)7 1
1998199
2WO2Wi21AL
. .........
Am. Assn for
Justice

. .G

Am. Bar
Assn

1.28

1.24

1.08

1.16

1.3

Akin, Gump
et al
Law Offices
of John T
O'Rourke
Assn of Trial
Lawyers of
America
Nat'l
Org/Social
Security
Claimant
Reps
US
u
s

23

20412005 2006 2007 Percent
8.32

5.74

row th
-31.0

1.2

1.26

1.24

1.18

1.24

-3.1

0.91

1.78

1.14

0.59

0.68

-25.3

0.57

0.57

-26.9

0.46

-78.5

0.78

0.66

0.21

0.2

0.12

1.26

0.36

0.46

2.14

3.52

3

2.2

3.46

6.57

7.07

7.24

0.16

0.38

0.56

0.72

0.59

0.57

0.36

0.34

0.34

0.44

175.0

0.02

0

0.16

0.13

0.2

0.14

038

0.43

2050.0

0.28

0.4

42.9

0.28] 0.32

14.3

Investigations
Services
Morrison &
Foerster
:Alston &
Bird
-

0.02

0.04

0.32

0.12

0.16

0.34

0.61

0.36

0.32

Top 10
percentI

63.1

61.2

58.5

53.2

59.5

64.0

62.9

58.6

56.6

55.2

Top 20
percent

79.5

76.8

73.7

70.3

73.9

78.8

73.9

70.2

68.9

69.0

1500.0

Based on the money invested in lobbying activities, we generated
a ranking in Table 10 of the different sectors according to their
70. See id.
71. OpenSecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database Lawyers/Law Firms, 2007,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?year=2007&lname=K01&id (last visited
Apr. 30, 2009) (to find all data, click on each respective year).
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influence on Congress. This ranking helped us analyze the direction
of the proposed changes and the relative strength of each sector over
Congress. At the same time, the aggregate amount of money given
cannot be the sole determinant of power in Congress. Rather, rates
of giving, the number of companies involved in the activities, and
recent increases in lobbying efforts can affect the ranking. We
therefore gave each sector a score from one (strong power in
Congress) to five (weak power).
Table 10: Ranking of Stakeholders by Power in Congress
Group
Ranking
Big Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Companies
Big Information Technology Companies
Litigators
Universities
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Courts
Prosecutors
Small Pharmaceutical Companies
Individual Inventors
Small Information Technology Companies

1
1
3
3
3
3
4
4
5
5

The strongest group is the big companies in the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology sectors. This group is one of the most powerful
lobbyist groups in Congress, as demonstrated in Table 7. We gave the
same rank to big companies in the computer and information
technology sectors, because they have recently shown greater
strength and a substantial increase in lobbying expenditures and
participation in the legislative process, as shown in Table 8. In the
case of small pharmaceutical companies, some lobbying activity
occurs, but for small computer and information technology
companies, their lobbying presence is undetectable.7 2 Universities
received a middle score because, even though they contribute a large
amount of money to lobbying, they lobby for other issues that are
more important to them than patent legislation.7 3 In the case of
litigators, they garner some support from the American Bar
Association and the AIPLA, although most law associations and
companies have priorities other than patent reform on their

72. See supra Tables 7 and 8.
73. See OpenSecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database Education, 2007,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?year=2007&lname=K1&id (last visited
Apr. 30, 2009).
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agendas.7 4 We assume that prosecutors will not have as much support
from these associations as litigators, because they generate lower
revenue. Individual inventors obtained a low score, because they lack
representation in lobbying activities. Finally, the Patent Office and
the courts have a medium level of influence on Congress given their
roles as checks on the patent system and on Congress with respect to
new patent legislation.
B.

Modeling Preferences

To analyze the process of legislative changes in patent law, we
will determine the preferences of each group with a stake in the
patent system. We assume the following main characteristics of the
patent system matter for the groups: (1) the quality of the patents; (2)
the strength of the property rights that the system provides; (3) the
speed of the granting process; (4) the fees that the Patent Office
charges; (5) the legal fees that inventors have to pay prosecutors and
litigators; (6) the importance of the Patent Office to the patent
system; and (7) the quality of the court system. 75 We distinguish
between legal fees charged by prosecutors for patent prosecution and
fees charged by litigators for patent litigation. All of these factors will
determine the net payoff for each actor involved in the patent system.
In the case of inventors, the payoff can be represented as follows:
Individuals
I = IH' (Q, PR,S,C,P,F,LFp,LFL)
Universities
( Q , PR
1 -1 u = 1u

S , C , P , F,LFP,LFL)

Corporations
H S(Q,PR,S, C,P,F,LFp,LFL)
S, C, P, LFL)
-c
-(QPR,

S=

I

H c = 1s

(Q, PR,S, C,P,F,LF,LFL)

Sc= ic(Q,PR,S, C,P,LFL).

74. See OpenSecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database Lawyers/Law Firms, 2007,
http://www.opensecrets.orgllobby/indusclient.php?year=2007&lname=KOI&id=
(last
visited Apr. 30, 2009).
75. We determine these main characteristics of the patent system based on our own
experience and analysis of such a system. We believe that most of the changes to the
patent system will have an impact on some or all of these characteristics.
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,' is the payoff for individual inventors. FI u is the payoff for
universities and other nonprofit organizations. fiH is the payoff for
corporate inventors, where the index i represents the type of
technology (A or B) and j the type of company (big (B) or small (S)).
Q is the quality of the patents granted (how well the system identifies
innovations that merit a patent). PR is the strength of property rights
protection offered by the patent system once one obtains a patent. S
is the speed of the services offered by the Patent Office. F represents
the fees charged by the Patent Office. LF, represents the legal fees
charged by prosecutors. LFL represents the legal fees and costs
charged by litigators. Variable C e(1,0) is the quality of the court
system in enforcing patent rights; 1 represents the highest quality and
0 the lowest quality. For the Patent Office, P E(1,0) signifies the
relevance of the Patent Office in the enforcement of the patent
system; 1 means that the Patent Office is the only enforcer of patents,
without any role for the courts, while 0 represents a situation in which
the Patent Office grants patents. However, in the latter case, the
decision does not carry any weight in the enforcement of the rights,
which is then reviewed and determined by the courts.
Next, we determine the outcome for each of the six inventor
types:
individuals, universities, big and small software and
information companies, and big and small pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies. In the case of individual inventors, we
assume that increases in the speed of the granting procedure and the
quality of the court system will increase their payoff. 76 We assume
that higher quality patents will have a negative effect on their payoff
function. The higher quality of the patents implies that many of the
applications for individual inventors will be rejected by the Patent
Office, decreasing the total payoff.
Stronger property rights
protection for granted patents will reduce the chances of litigation,
thereby reinforcing the bargaining power of individual inventors in
the market.77 As for the speed of the granting process, we assume
that the faster the Patent Office grants a patent, the higher the payoff
for individual inventors, because they can start to enjoy the monopoly
benefits of the patent earlier. The existence of an effective court
system enhances patent protection against excessive challenges.78
Even though an effective court increases the chance of a bad patent
being revoked, individual inventors would like to use the court as a
76.
actors'
77.
78.

See infra Appendix A (showing how changes in the different variables affect the
preferences and net payoff of each group).
See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 90-93.
See id.
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bargaining tool for obtaining licensing fees from corporations. 9
Assuming most corporations would prefer to avoid costly litigation
procedures, they would more likely pay individual inventors a
licensing fee. Finally, we assume that an increase in the importance
of the Patent Office in the patent system will have a net negative
impact on individual investors. Even though it is cheaper to resort to
the Patent Office than the courts in certain patent matters, individual
inventors may use the courts (even if more expensive) to bargain for
their property rights. We assume that an increase in the fees charged
by the Patent Office or by prosecuting lawyers will decrease the net
payoff from patents. In the case of litigation fees and costs, the net
effect is undetermined. On the one hand, higher litigation fees will
increase the expected payoff from the settlement with corporations.
On the other hand, it will make it more difficult for individuals to pay
the cost of taking their cases to court.
This study assumes that universities have a different set of
preferences than individual inventors. Researchers at universities will
benefit from higher quality patents, the speed of the Patent Office
granting process, and an effective court system that enhances patent
protection against excessive challenges. In general, universities are
indifferent to an increase in the importance of the Patent Office.
Increases in the fees charged by the Patent Office or by prosecutors
decrease the net payoff from the patents. Litigation fees also have a
negative effect on universities. In the case of patent enforcement,
universities are largely indifferent. While universities would like their
property rights enforced, they may not like strict property rights that
do not allow collaboration or the use of previous inventions to
advance knowledge and research.
Corporate inventors have a more disparate distribution of
preferences. We have divided corporate inventors according to two
main variables: the size or market power of the company (big or
small) and the type of technology with which the company works.
We assume two types of technology: one that does not depend too
much on the patent system to promote innovation (A) and one in
which patenting is key to fostering innovation and market power (B).
The assumption is that the first type of technology is related to
software and information technology, where companies prefer a
lower level of protection and enforcement for patents, while the
second type of technology is related to industries that depend on
strong patent protection for their innovations, like pharmaceuticals
79. See id. at 93-95.
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and biotechnology.'
We assume that the quality of patents will
increase the payoff for big companies in both sectors. 8
Small
companies in the information technology sector will be negatively
affected by better quality, and small companies in the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology sectors, usually start-ups that strongly depend on
the success of the patenting of their inventions, will also be negatively
affected. Higher quality patents mean that fewer patents will be
granted. Small companies in both sectors share a preference for highquality patents, because small companies in information technology
depend on their technology patents to profit.
We assume that greater speed in the Patent Office will have a
positive result for all types of companies, except for big companies in
the information technology sector. A higher speed in granting
patents by the Patent Office has two disparate effects on the
companies in all sectors. If a company is patenting an innovation,
then an increase in the speed of the Patent Office will increase its
payoff. However, if the increase in speed leads to an increase in the
issuance of bad patents, then the increase in speed could be harmful
in terms of the resulting litigation with competitors. In the case of big
companies in the software and information technology sector, the
assumption is that the negative effect is greater, in absolute value,
than the positive effect. However, smaller companies and companies
in the patent-prone sector prefer fast decisions on their pending
patents.
In the case of the quality, or ability, of the court system to
enforce property rights, preferences will also differ from sector to
sector. Big companies in the software and information technology
sector will prefer a system with a minimal role for the courts, because
most of their innovations contain multiple patented innovations from
competing firms. Rather, they would prefer to handle these issues
outside the courtroom.82 We assume that small companies in both
sectors prefer a higher degree of court participation, because the
small companies frequently provide their innovations to bigger
companies in the development of new products. Courts ensure that
their property rights are protected.
The degree of property rights protection provided by a patent is
related to the role of the courts. This study assumes that big
80. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1589-93 (describing the different needs for
property rights protection from different technologies).
81. See infra Appendix A (describing factors that impact net payoff for big
companies).
82. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 93-95.
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companies in the information technology sector prefer a lower degree
of property rights protection and enforcement to avoid becoming
hostage to small companies' patents.
Big companies in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, as well as small companies
in both sectors, prefer strong enforcement of their patents.
We assume that the relevance of the Patent Office has a negative
effect on smaller companies in the information technology sector and
pharmaceutical and biotechnology start-ups. Big companies in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors rely on the courts to
protect their property rights.83 Big companies in software and
information technology sectors will prefer a greater role for the
Patent Office because of the lower degree of complexity of the
process and the better chances of reaching an agreement with
competitors to avoid high litigation costs. 8'
This study assumes that prosecution fees have a negative impact
on the payoff of small companies in both sectors, while big companies
are indifferent. Changes in litigation fees, as in the case of individual
inventors, will have an undetermined effect on their payoff functions.
In the case of big companies, the effect will depend on the specific
situation of each company.
For example, companies in the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors that have a patent portfolio
to protect will prefer higher litigation fees to discourage small
companies from challenging them in court. Companies in software
and information technology fields are faced with a similar situation
with the patents they own. However, they also face an important
burden from high litigation fees whenever they are challenged,
because they use patents from competitors in developing a new

83. See Josephine Hearn, The Executive: Business on the Prowl for Patent 'Trolls,'

THE HILL, Apr. 14, 2005, available at http://thehill.com/the-executive/business-on-theprowl-for-patent-trolls-2005-04-14.html ("But while nearly all the stakeholders agree that
the patent system is broken, industry groups representing patent holders look likely to
split on how to address the problem. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) has indicated that it would prefer fewer curbs on patent litigation...
because its industry tends to litigate in defense of its own patents more often. 'The
pharmaceutical industry, because of the nature of their industry, has different views, an
honest difference of opinions,' said Emery Simon at the Business Software Alliance.").
84. See Q&A: Microsoft Press Pass, Microsoft Calls for Reforms to the U.S. Patent
System (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2005/marO5/0310patentreform.mspx [hereinafter Q&A: Microsoft Press Pass] ("[W]e need to ensure
that interested parties have sufficient opportunities to alert the PTO about questionable
patents within the PTO review process itself. Under current law, parties typically can only
raise concerns after patent issuance by filing a reexamination request or a lawsuit-an
obvious disincentive, given the costs of patent litigation.").
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product.8 5 This situation is very common in software and information
technologies and has raised concerns from companies in this
industry.86
In the case of the Patent Office, the net payoff can be
represented as:
T
ri P O = -I PTO (Q, PR, S, C, P, F).
We assume that increases in the Patent Office fees, the speed of
service, the degree of property rights protection of the patents, and
the quality of the court system will increase the payoff for the Patent
Office. The effect of higher fees on the net payoff for the Patent
Office is obvious. If legislation passes that allows the Patent Office to
grant patents faster, it will also increase the Patent Office payoff,
since that would imply a less cumbersome procedure and more time
for evaluators to process a higher number of patent applications in a
given year. The presence of a high-quality court system and strong
property rights will increase the Patent Office payoff, because any
error the Patent Office makes will be reviewed by the judicial system,
and the patents it grants will have a high value in terms of property
rights.
The following equation describes patent attorney preferences:
IBAR = rBAR (Q, PRS,C,P,F,LFP, LFL)
f-iBAR = rBAR (Q, PRS,CPFLF LFL),

where FPBAR is the payoff of patent prosecutors, and

is the
payoff for patent litigators. Increases in the quality of patents,
prosecution fees, the speed of the procedure, the importance of the
Patent Office, and the strength of the property rights of patents will
all increase the prosecutors' net payoff. An increase in the fees
charged by the Patent Office will decrease the payoff of prosecutors,
as the cost for filing new inventions increases. Increases in the power
of the court system will decrease the payoff for prosecutors because
of the diminished role of the Patent Office. The increase in the power
of the Patent Office will increase the value of the work of prosecutors,
increasing the demand for their services and, therefore, their fees. A
higher speed of the Patent Office procedure will increase the payoff
for prosecutors because they can process their claims faster. The
effect of litigation costs on prosecutors is undetermined.
,LBAR

85. Id. "[Olur popular products and strong balance sheet make us among the largest
targets of patent litigation in the country. We typically spend close to US$100 million

annually to defend against an average of 35-40 patent lawsuits simultaneously." Id.
86. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 46, passim.
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This study assumes that the effect of higher-quality patents on
litigators' payoffs is slightly negative. Even though higher quality will
increase the ability of litigators to defend their cases in court, a lower
level of quality in patents issued would increase the number of
challenges in court. As a result, the assumption is that the latter
effect is, in general, stronger. As to the power of the Patent Office,
litigators would not like an increase in the role of the Patent Office in
the patent system, because this increased role could hinder the
number of cases going to court. In addition, only litigation fees have
a positive effect on profits for litigators. Changes in the Patent Office
and prosecutors' fees will have a negative effect on litigators, as fewer
inventors will use the patent system. Finally, stronger property rights
protection for patents will increase the litigators' payoff, because their
services in court will become more valuable.
The payoff for the court system is represented by the following
equation:
(Q, PR, S, C, P).
1 ICOURT = HI COURT
We assume that increases in the quality of patents will reduce the
number of patents being challenged and will make it easier for the
courts to decide the matter. Stronger property rights on the patent
will facilitate the activities of the court and their ability to enforce
property rights. On the other hand, an increase in the speed by which
patents are granted will decrease the payoff for the courts because
they would receive more cases, and the chances of a mistake by the
Patent Office would increase. Courts will prefer not to delegate any
power to the Patent Office, while increasing their power to make
decisions regarding the enforcement of patents. Nonetheless, this
study assumes that the courts do not play a major role in pushing for
any particular patent legislation reform because they have no
economic stake in the patent system beyond maximizing their own
leisure.
Table 11 shows how changes in each of the factors analyzed will
impact the different actors.
Table 11: Preferences of Stakeholders
Speed

Quality

+

+

Property Power
Strength PTO

Power
Court

Pro
Fees

Litigation
Fees

Individual
Inventors

Universities
Small
Companies

A

+
III

+/+

+/-

+
+

+/-

Prosecution
Fees
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Quality

Big
Companies
A
Small
Companies
B
Big
Companies

-

+

+

B

Property
Strength

Power
PTO

+

+

Power
Court

+

+-

+

+

+

+

+

+

+
+
+

+

+

+

PTO
Fees

Litigation
Fees
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Prosecution
Fees

+

II_+

Prosecutors
Litigators
Courts
Patent

+
+

Office

+

+/-+
+

+
+
+

Note: + Positive Effect; - Negative Effect; +/- Indefinite Effect

These preferences play an important role in shaping
congressional decisions about the patent system because the decisions
are made according to the preferences of these different groups. The
preferences of Congress can be summarized as follows:
1-ICO

HCO(QqFFF

rTc11c (Q, S, q, p,F, LFp,9LFL).

In this case, changes in any of the variables will generate an
ambiguous effect on congressional preferences. Therefore, the final
result will be determined based on the strength of these players'
ability to influence Congress.
Now that we have determined the preferences for each group in
the political economy of the patent system, we analyze the case of a
proposal to decrease the presumption of validity of a patent and its
effect on each group. The presumption of validity 7 is one of the most
controversial issues regarding the patent system. 8 When a patent is
granted, it is presumed valid. If legislation passes decreasing the
presumption of validity for patents, the current patent system will
undergo two major changes. First, the quality of the patents would
increase, because bad patents granted by the Patent Office would be
open to a stronger challenge in court. Therefore, inventors will not
risk obtaining a patent unless they can get it through the Patent
87. John A. Jeffrey, Preservingthe Presumption of Patent Validity: An Alternative to
Outsourcing the U.S. Patent Examiner's Prior Art Search, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 761, 765
(2003) ("U.S. patents are presumed valid. Because courts defer to the USPTO's special
technical expertise and have faith in the examination process, challengers must show a
patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence. The courts' deference to the integrity
of the examination process, however, is predicated on the examiner's consideration of the
most pertinent prior art during examination.").
88. See id.
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Office and the courts. Second, the strength of the property rights
obtained through a patent would decrease, as patents become subject
to more challenges than would occur with a stronger presumption of
validity.
Table 12 shows the preferences of each group in the case of a
decrease in the presumption of validity for patents. In this case, the
assumption is that a decrease in the presumption of validity will
decrease the strength of property rights and enhance the quality of
the patent system in general. For simplicity, we assume that there are
no changes in the other factors.
Table 12: Decrease in the Presumption of Validity
Decrease on

Increase i
Quality
Q lity ..

Property Rights
Strength
<0
(Individuals)
Universities

<0

aQ

aPR

I.U = 9
">

__R

Corp (AB)

SPR

<0

aQ

-AB >0

SQ

SPR

Corp (BS)

anCs < 0
aPR

OQ

Corp (BB)

aPR <0

'9Q

Patent Office

SQ

0

-<
SPR

5IIER

Court

<0

aQ

an

sriBAR

BAR

IL'n < 0
aPR

a SPR

st

0

Positive

<0

Negative

>0

Positive

<0

Negative

>0

Negative

>0

Undetermined

>0

Undetermined

<0

Negative

SQHA

aPR
BAR (Litigators)

> 0P

il PTO
ar

aniPT
ai PBR

BAR (Prosecutors)

Negative

SQ

aPR
Corp (AS)

Total Effect

<0

SQ
a

OQ

>0

Undetermined
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The effect on the different groups is very heterogeneous, as seen
in Figure 4. The "status quo" is represented by the intersection of
both axes. The positive vertical axis represents an increase in the
quality of the patents, while the positive horizontal axis represents an
increase in the property-rights strength of patents. The circle for each
actor represents their preferred point (for example, for the Patent
Office, the preferred point is one where patents have high quality and
strong property-rights protection). The size of the points represents
the strength of each of these actors in Congress, as defined in Table
10.
The reduction in the presumption of validity will move the status
quo to the point labeled "Reform," where the quality of the patents
increases and the strength of property rights of patents decreases. Big
companies in the information technology sector will support the
reform, because it will move the system toward their preferred points
of quality and property rights.
Figure4
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USPTO

Corp(AB)
Universiti s

Courts
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On the opposite end, small companies in the information
technology sector, start-ups in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
sectors, litigators, and individual inventors will strongly oppose the
reform. Universities will support the reform, because the increase in
quality should compensate them for the decrease in property rights
strength. The effect of the reform on the courts, the Patent Office,
and prosecutors is uncertain; they will support the reform only if the
gains from higher quality can compensate them for the losses from
lower property rights strength for patents. Finally, big companies in
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors will oppose the reform,
because they value property protection much more than quality. As a
result, even if the reform improves the quality of the patents,
companies will not be compensated for the loss in property-rights
protection.
This situation illustrates the strong confrontation
between the biggest players in Congress-the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology sectors against the information technology sector. As
a result, a proposal like this will be very difficult, if not impossible, to
pass. Furthermore, this issue could become highly polarized, and the
actors left in the middle could be forced to pick a side, increasing the
divide in Congress.
II. PATENT REFORM IN 2007-2008

Given the preferences of the different actors, Congress becomes
the focal point where these preferences will play out in pursuing a
reform to the current patent system. In general, the strength of each
group inside Congress will depend on its ability to lobby and obtain
the support from a majority of congresspersons. This Part analyzes
how the fate of the proposed legislation ("the bill") depends on the
ability of these groups to mobilize resources to support their
preferences.
As we demonstrated in Part I, the most important lobby groups
are the information technology and pharmaceutical sectors, since they
provide the bulk of money to lobby for or against patent reform.
Table 13 shows the money given by different economic sectors with
an interest in patent reform to the members of the House of
Representatives that are part of the Judiciary Committee's
subcommittee in charge of the patent reform. As one can see, most
of these groups interested in patent reform are giving, on average,
more to the members of the subcommittee than to the members of
the Judiciary Committee in general.
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Table 13: Groups' Contributionsto Members of the House of
Representatives in the JudiciaryCommittee and Subcommittee from
2007-2008 (dollars)89
Sector
Name

Nae cm.Lawyers
Comp. Pharm.
/IT

& Law
Assocs.

Banks

Manuf.

Univers.
& Educ.
Assocs.

House Subcommittee

Smith
Issa
Keller
Feeney
Coble
Goodlatte
Chabot
Cannon
Gallegly
Sensenbrenner
Pence
Berman
Conyers
Schiff
Sherman
Lofgren
Boucher
Wexler
Watt
Jackson-Lee
Cohen
Johnson
Weiner
Sutton
Total
Contribution to

54,561
18,125
8,800
13,300
5,000
42,900
17,600
40,092
5,100
4,000
14,387
50,928
43,068
14,500
9,450
119,943
56,700
25,475
3,006
1,500
0
1,000
2,500
1,250

18,750
44,250
3,500
23,100
13,000
1,000
16,800
25,400
17,800
2,500
11,500
2,000
7,500
8,600
11,600
34,500
24,100
3,250
5,000
0
4,500
8,000
2,000
2,550

30,400
19,210
45,960
52,525
26,400
52,227
68,200
24,150
13,950
17,732
45,250
127,600
91,722
90,894
43,546
44,090
76,497
209,985
34,550
19,950
36,063
45,850
3,050
63,048

27,050
0
12,800
42,500
3,000
5,500
36,500
3,000
4,000
9,500
18,350
22,700
3,000
7,927
12,000
4,000
23,500
20,500
31,000
0
5,500
2,000
2,000
(2,250)

3,500
3,170
8,250
13,300
13,300
17,000
52,200
7,000
1,500
8,000
20,100
8,000
4,000
4,500
12,300
4,500
57,750
2,300
2,000
5,350
0
500
0
9,100

2,550
775
4,800
1,000
0
3,000
0
1,350
1,100
1,250
2,750
0
0
5,760
5,350
8,050
3,600
10,210
3,000
500
1,500
0
1,000
1,250

All Members

553,185

291,200

1,282,849

294,077

257,620

58,795

23,049

12,133

53,452

12,253

10,734

2,449

Average
Contribution

89. Authors' own elaboration based on data from www.opensecrets.org. The data in
this Table does not correspond to data currently found on the website, but the authors
have informed the editors that the Table reflects the numbers as they appeared in August
2008, when the authors accessed the website. This and other data used by the authors in
this Article is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
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Sector
Name

Comp.

Pharm.

Lawyers

& Law
Assocs.

Banks

Manuf.

Univers.

& Educ.
Assocs.

Rest of House JudiciaryComm.

......

Lungren

14,800

6,000

45,600

9,000

11,000

0

King
Forbes
Franks
Jordan
Gohmert
Nadler
Scott
Delahunt
Sanchez
Baldwin
Davis
WassermanSchultz
Gutierez
Waters
Ellison

2,250
9,600
2,000
2,750
3,750
3,000
2,750
0
10,741
3,050
8,000

1,000
0
0
6,750
0
0
1,000
0
0
13,348
33,715

2,000
18,500
8,500
16,950
29,250
122,750
33,050
11,000
31,600
29,000
153,853

12,000
14,000
5,000
7,000
12,800
0
6,000
0
6,144
1,000
21,500

7,000
9,600
2,000
38,800
7,000
2,500
2,500
0
5,000
4,000
8,250

0
485
0
1,225
0
8,800
13,050
0
1,250
11,450
13,700

14,164
4,600
0
19,100

10,716
0
0
9,300

117,317
36,800
13,253
58,481

15,000
2,500
0
11,700

9,500
0
0
2,017

0
0
250
12,300

100,555

81,829

727,904

123,644

109,167

62,510

6,285

5,844

45,494

7,727

6,822

3,907

Total
Contributions to
the Rest of the
Jud. Comm.

Average
Contribution
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Table 14 shows that the same patterns repeat in the Senate's
Judiciary Committee.
Table 14: Groups' Contributionsto Senate Members in the Judiciary
Committee from 2007-2008 (dollars)9
Sectors
Univers.
Lawyers &
& Educ.
Comp
Law
Assocs.
Banks Manuf. Assocs.
Pharm.
Name
/IT
Senate Judiciary Committee-Republicans
32,900
62,000
31,750
462,225
167,349
101,143
Specter
0
1,000
6,000
4,750
15,800
5,000
Hatch
14,900
64,600
521,292 111,448
93,196
119,367
Cornyn
0
0
2.000
10,455
13,051
2,000
Coburn
9,300
50,250
27,650
254,567
21,700
22,300
Sessions
0
0
0
1,000
0
7,000
Brownback
7,000
44,300
49,363
388,760
43,550
14,300
Graham
1,500
10,500
9,500
17,115
1,000
31,000
Grassley
0
0
500
4,000
14,000
3,000
Kyl
Total
Contributions
to Repub.

275,110

399,646

1,660,664

263,311

211,050

65,600

30,568

44,405

184,518

29,257

23,450

7,289

Committee-Democrats
15,250
0
8,000
0
0
0
24,550
55,900
22,804
0
5,000
3,500
65,820
700
3,500
105,830
7,000
55,891
48,700
5,000
3,000

2,000
0
5,850
0
12,000
18,000
1,500

1,000
0
0
1.000
1,750
4,500
0

0
0
0
0
4,800
0
4,500

Members of
the Comm.
Average
Contribution
to Repub.

Members of
the Comm.

Senate Judiciay
Whitehouse
Kohl
Kennedy
Feinstein
Biden
Leahy
Cardin

90. Authors' own elaboration based on data from www.opensecrets.org. The data in
this Table does not correspond to data currently found on the website, but the authors
have informed the editors that the Table reflects the numbers as they appeared in August
2008 when the authors accessed the website. This, and other, data used by the authors in
this Article is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
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Name
Schumer
Feingold
Durbin
Total
Contributions
to Dem.

Comp
IT

Pharm.

Sectors
Lawyers &
Law
Banks
Assocs.

Univers.
& Educ.
Manuf. Assocs.

1,000
8,075
53,050

0
7,466
28,950

1,000
81,850
952,443

5,000
5,700
30,600

0
2,300
35,000

0
15,150
61,250

158,820

109,016

1,295,443

80,650

45,550

85,700

15,882

10,901.60

129,544.30

8,065

4,555

8,570

Members of
the Comm.

Average
Contribution
to Dem.
Members of
the Comm.

In order to see how these groups influence Congress, we have
analyzed the Patent Reform Act of 2007, introduced as House Bill
1908 in Congress, which proposed an ambitious reform to the U.S.
patent system.9 1 In particular, we analyze the general vote in favor of
this bill in the House of Representatives. House Bill 1908 was passed
on September 7, 2007 by the House of Representatives by 220
favorable votes against 175 negative votes and 37 non-voting
congresspersons.92 Accordingly, the following logistic model is used
to analyze voting behavior:
=
P(Y = 1) = F(x)

1 ex
I1+exPl

In this equation, Y=1 refers to a vote in favor of the bill and fi is a
set of parameters that captures the effects of changes in variables x on
the probability of the bill being passed. The explanatory variables
(i.e., independent variables, x) used are the following:

91. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110-cong-bills&docid=f:h1908
ih.txt.pdf.
92. OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. 1908:
FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 863 (Sept. 7, 2007), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/
2007/ro11863.xml [hereinafter ROLL CALL].

2009]

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PATENT SYSTEM

Republican
Pharma
Percentage

IT Percentage
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Percentage
Manufacturing
Manfatg
Percentage
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Dummy variable equals 1 if the congressperson is
Republican and 0 if he/she is a Democrat
Percentage of total money pharmaceutical companies
give to each congressperson as percentage of the
total money given to House representatives
Percentage of total money information technology
companies give to each congressperson as percentage
of the total money given to House representatives
Percentage of total money attorneys and law
associations give to each congressperson as
percentage of the total money given to House
representatives
Percentage of total money manufacturing/chemicals
companies give to each congressperson as percentage
of the total money given to House representatives

Sub-Committee

Dummy variable equals 1 if the congressperson is
member of the subcommittee in the judiciary
committee in charge of discussing the bill

California, Texas,
Ohio, New Jersey

Dummy variables equal 1 if the congressperson
comes from one of these states

SubcommPharma

SubcommIT

SubcommAttorney

Variable with the percentage of money given by the
pharmaceutical sector to each member of the
subcommittee in charge of the bill
Variable with the percentage of money given by the
information technology sector to each member of the
subcommittee in charge of the bill
Variable with the percentage of money given by the
attorney sector to each member of the subcommittee
in charge of the bill

SubcommManuf

Variable with the percentage of money given by the
manufacturing/chemical sector to each member of
the subcommittee in charge of the bill

PharmaRep

Percentage of money given by the pharmaceutical
sector to Republicans

ITRep

Percentage of money given by the information
technology sector to Republicans
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Accordingly, Table 15 shows the econometric results for three
different specifications for the econometric model. Model 1 shows
that Republican members of Congress generally opposed the bill,
while Democrats were more inclined to support it. The money
received by the information technology sector has a positive effect on
the voting result, since congresspersons that received a higher
percentage of money voted for the bill. The same positive effect in
favor of the bill is seen for the percentage of money received from
attorneys and law organizations. In the case of manufacturing, higher
contributions implied a vote against the bill. Contributions from the
pharmaceutical sector have a negative sign (against the bill), but its
coefficient is not significant. In the case of the states, congresspersons
from California and Texas, which have important sectors related to
information technology, tended to vote for the bill, while those from
states like Ohio and New Jersey, more related to traditional
manufacturing and pharmaceutical industries, tended to vote against
the bill.93 Finally, the members of the subcommittee in charge of the
bill voted, in general, favorably for this bill. While the financial
sector, universities, and small companies were affected by this House
bill, their contributions were not found to be statistically significant.
Instead, lobbying efforts by large information technology companies,
large pharmaceutical companies, attorney groups, and the
manufacturing sector were most significant.
In order to better understand the relationship between the votes
and the contributions made by these lobby groups, Model 2 in Table
15 includes four more variables with the contributions that each of
the main groups gave to the members of the subcommittee in charge
of the bill. In this case, while there are no changes in the variables
included in the first model, congresspersons in the subcommittee who
received more money from the pharmaceutical sector voted strongly
against the bill.
This corroborates the suspicion that the
pharmaceutical sector was against this bill. Similarly to the results in
Model 1, in the subcommittee, contributions from the information
technology and attorney sectors are associated with votes for the bill,
while manufacturing contributions were associated with votes against
the bill.
93. In this model, we include variables for those states that have a significant
coefficient. For example, in the case of representatives from Pennsylvania, we would
expect that they would be against the law, given the strong presence of traditional
manufacturing in that state. When we ran the regression, the coefficient for Pennsylvania
was negative, as expected, but it was not significant. Accordingly, we decided not to
include it.
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Table 15: Econometric Model
Dependent Variable Positive Vote for House Bill 1908
Model 1
Variable
republican

Coefficient
-1.54714 ***
0.261662

Model 2
Coefficient

-1.55098

-1.30192 ***
0.392937

(0.269444)
90.4158 *
47.99229
12.05006
38.56906

pharmaperc-e

106.4904 **
50.49571
-3.83921 ***
37.46632
151.7506 ***
53.08203

166.1444

attorneyperc

-102.498

manufperc

-87.1842
29.93012

itpercentage

Model 3

58.21919

37.82971
1.348921
texas

1.320997***
0.492367

***

0.504386

1.357605***
0.508268

1.657468
0.429963

1.659149
0.43186

1.678006 ***
0.447417

-1.53776 *
0.828268

-1.46857
0.899108

-1.47614 *
0.81032

newjersey

-1.89967 ***
0.885239

-2.00109 **
0.902252

-2.2775 **
1.028431

subcommittee**

1.683704 ***
0.628334

7.567173
1.913171

ohio

1.724832 ***
0.657546

-1686.05
subcompharma
426.3161
764.2731
subcomit
208.1647
-1306.16
subcomatto-y
subcomanuf
PharmaDem
PharmaRep
ITDem
ITRep

296.2498
-47.378
65.57166
110.7505 *
62.87282
-106.15 *
59.49987
32.02913
42.66964
225.516 ***
80.8383
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Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficient

Coefficient

AttorneyRep
AttorneyDem
ManufRep
ManufDem
Constant
Observations
Wald Chi2
(Prob)
Pseudo R2
Correctly
classified
Note:

0.368218
0.23282
395
84.5
(0.000)
0.241

0.368926
0.236703
395
97.8
(0.000)
0.265

75.44%

75.70%

[Vol. 87
Model 3
77.34039
127.1144
177.2783 ***
67.81946
-98.7381 *
54.91936
-93.7182 **
41.0438
0.245051
0.26785
395
81.5
(0.000)
0.2592
76.71%

Statistically significant at 1%
•* Statistically significant at 5%
* Statistically significant at 10%

***

The higher coefficient in the regression for members of the
subcommittee in Model 2 indicates that the companies concentrate
their lobbying efforts on the subcommittee members, who set the
agenda and draft and move legislation. Finally, we introduce another

twist to this model by separating the money given by these groups to
Republicans and Democrats. Since Republicans were generally
against the bill, while Democrats seemed to vote for the bill, we

would like to see how each of these parties was influenced by the
contributions from these interest groups.

As Model 3 shows,

contributions from the pharmaceutical sector did not seem to
motivate Democrats against the legislation since they still voted for
the bill. On the other hand, the more contributions Republicans
received from the pharmaceutical sector, the more inclined they were
to vote against the bill.

The fact that Republicans received, on

average, $16,200 from pharmaceuticals, while Democrats received
$14,800, could be a factor in this decision.94 In the case of information

technology contributions, there seems to be no significant effect on
Democrats.

Nonetheless, Republicans seemed to vote for the bill

94. Authors' own elaboration based on data from www.opensecrets.org. The data
does not correspond to data currently found on the website, but the authors have
informed the editors that the Table reflects the numbers as they appeared in August 2008,
when the authors accessed the website. This and other data used by the authors in this
Article is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
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when they received more contributions from the information
technology sector. The information technology sector contributed on
average $12,900 to Democrats and $9,200 to Republicans.9 5 In Model
3, the difference in the sign of the coefficients for lobbying
contributions made by pharmaceutical and information technology
companies for Democrats and Republicans shows the differences that
the lobbying efforts had on both parties. The higher coefficient for
the information technology sector contributions could be an
indication of the renewed efforts showed by the information
technology sector in lobbying contributions in the last few years. The
attorney sector was more successful in getting Democrats to vote for
the bill, because the more contributions they made to Democrats, the
higher the probability of Democrats voting for the bill. The
contributions from the attorney sector did not have any effect on the
vote of Republicans. Finally, the manufacturing sector had a strong
effect on both Republicans and Democrats, as the more contributions
they received, the less they were willing to vote for the bill. These
results show that these groups have a strong influence on the voting
behavior of congresspersons, and they have a real influence on the
direction of patent reform. Further, these results reinforce the
relationship between the different groups' preferences and their
lobbying strength in Congress. As Table 15 shows, these models can
predict the votes in Congress with respect to this bill with seventy-five
percent accuracy. This is an excellent rate of prediction given the
simplicity of our model.96
In order to analyze the importance of each variable on the
probability of voting, we use Models 1 and 2 to see how an increase in
any of the explanatory variables is going to affect the probability of
the congresspersons voting affirmatively for the bill.97 As Table 16
shows, in both cases, the size of the increase or decrease in the
probability of voting is very important due to changes in each of the
independent variables. These results corroborate not only that the

95. Authors' own elaboration based on data from www.opensecrets.org. The data
does not correspond to data currently found on the website, but the authors have
informed the editors that the Table reflects the numbers as they appeared in August 2008,
when the authors accessed the website. This and other data used by the authors in this
Article is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
96. If we run this model with just a dummy variable, without any of the independent
variables, the explanatory power of the model decreases to fifty-five percent of the
observations.
97. It is common to calculate the model in the mean values of the explanatory
variables and then to increase each of the variables by a standard deviation in order to see
what the effect is on the probability of voting.
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explanatory variables' coefficients are statistically significant, but also
that they are practically important in explaining voting behavior in
Congress.
Table 16: Effects of Changes in Independent Variables on the
Probabilityof Voting
Probability

Change from Baseline

Model 1
Baseline Probability (*)

0.32

Change in Variable
Change in IT

0.42

31.3

Change in Attorney

0.43

35.6

Change in Manufacturing

0.24

-25.2

From Texas

0.63

99.5

From California

0.71

122.6

From Ohio

0.09

-71.1

From New Jersey

0.06

-79.4

Belongs to Subcommittee

0.72

124.2

Democrat

0.68

115.3

Model 2
Baseline Republican (**)

0.26

Change in Pharma

0.20

-21.1

Change in IT

0.37

43.1

Change in Manufacturing

0.20

-23.6

Belongs to Committee

0.66

155.9

From Texas

0.58

122.5

From California

0.65

151.8

From Ohio

0.07

-71.5

From New Jersey

0.03

-86.6

Baseline Democrat (***)

0.66

Change in Pharma

0.73

10.6

Change in IT

0.69

4.0

Change in Manufacturing

0.58

-11.6
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Change from Baseline

(%)
Model I
Belongs to Committee

0.92

38.9

From Texas

0.88

33.9

From California

0.91

38.4

From Ohio

0.31

-53.5

From New Jersey

0.17

-74.9

Notes: (*) The baseline represents a Republican representative who is not part of the
subcommittee and is not from any of the states used as dependent variables. (**) This baseline
represents a Republican representative who does not come from any of the states used in the
model and does not belong to the subcommittee. (***) This baseline represents a Democrat
representative who does not come from any of the states used in the model and does not belong
to the subcommittee. The dependent variables are changed by one standard deviation and the
probability is calculated in order to see the predicted change in the probability of voting for the
bill.

One of the main results from these models is that the effect of
the information technology lobbying data on voting behavior is larger
than the effect of the pharmaceutical lobbying data on voting
behavior.
Several possible reasons explain these different
magnitudes.
First, as evidenced in Graph 1, the information
technology sector increased the amount of money spent on lobbying
during the last few congressional cycles at a larger rate than the
pharmaceutical sector.
This could have generated a stronger
reception to the ideas of reforming the patent system according to
their preferences.
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Graph 198
Total Contributions in Congress
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Second, Graph 2 illustrates that the information technology
sector could have targeted members of the majority (Democrats in
the last two election cycles) more aggressively, creating a stronger
environment for support for a friendlier patent system. The logistic
regression analysis of the voting in the House on patent reform shows
that Congress does not appear to have a strong ideological point of
view independent of the stakeholders in the patent system. Instead,
their votes are closely associated with the lobbying efforts of the
major stakeholders, and the success of any patent reform effort will
depend on the ability of the major sectors99 to come together and
coordinate their activities and preferences.

98. OpenSecrets.org, Industry Profiles, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/index.
php (last visited Apr. 30, 2009) (to find data, click on "Pharmaceuticals" and "Computer
Equipment & Services").
99. The major sectors are information technology, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing
companies, and the patent attorney group, based on our analysis of voting on H.R. 1908.
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Graph 2100
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In the end, these and other political factors could have increased
the probability of success for the bill in the House. However, despite
the strong effect of information technology spending on the final vote
for the bill, it was not strong enough to carry the day in the Senate,
where the legislation died.
One of the main problems with these kinds of models is that
campaign contributions can be an endogenous variable. For example,
donors do not give money just to induce the congressperson to vote
for the bill but also because the congressperson shares an ideological
position with the donor. In this case, we should control for the
presence of endogenous variables, as well-explained in literature.1 1
Most of these studies estimate a simultaneous system of equations
using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood ("FIML") to solve
100. Open Secrets.org, Industry Profiles, supra note 98.
101. For a discussion on how to treat endogeneity in these econometric models, see
Henry Chappel, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous
Probit-Tobit Model, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 77, 77-83 (1982); Thomas Stratmann,

Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions
Matter?, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 127, 127-36 (1995) [hereinafter Stratmann, Contributions
and Voting]; Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering
Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606, 606 (1991).
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the problem of endogeneity."°
In our case, we also solve a
simultaneous system of equations using the Maximum Likelihood
regression model, but following William Greene, we also pursue a
probit model with 3SLS. 103 By using this technique, we want to
corroborate that the contribution variables have an effect on voting
behavior after controlling for possible endogenous issues. In our
case, we contend that the case for endogeneity is not as plausible as
with more ideological issues. The case for patent reform is not as
ideologically divisive as the cases for death penalty or gun control.
We are confronted with a case in which all economic sectors pursue
property-rights protection, but they prefer a system that is more
adaptable to their industry conditions. As a consequence, controlling
for endogeneity could introduce other factors that undermine the full
extent of the relationship between the economic groups'
contributions and a congressperson's willingness to vote for the bill.
In this case, we use the percentage of vote obtained by each
congressperson in the last election as an instrumental variable. This
variable should not be related to the particular vote with respect to
this bill, but it could be related to the amount of contributions given
to the congresspersons. Given the large number of instrumental
variables needed to be able to run the full models as specified above,
we proceed to estimate the models with one contribution variable at a
time. The results are shown in Appendix C. As shown, most of the
contribution variables retain their explanatory power after correcting
for endogeneity.
III. CASE STUDIES
Based on the econometric results, which corroborate our
preferences' model, in this Part, we will analyze two very important
proposals for the reform of the patent system. First, we look at the
proposal of a third party opposition regime where challengers can
request that patents undergo additional examination within the
Patent Office without having to go through the courts. Second, we
focus on the main changes proposed in the patent reform bill

102. See, e.g., Stratmann, Contributionsand Voting, supra note 101, at 129.
103. See WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 407 (5th ed. Prentice Hall
2003) (1990). "For normally distributed disturbances, it can also be shown that 3SLS has
the same asymptotic distribution as the full-information maximum likelihood estimator,
which is asymptotically efficient among all estimators." Id. Three Stages Least Squares
("3SLS") is an econometric technique used when dealing with simultaneous equations
models. Id. at 405-07, 414.
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introduced in Congress in 2005 and again in 2 00 7 ."°4 The success of

the reforms depends on the strategic position of the groups with a
stake in the patent system. As a result, the patent system, as with
most regulatory systems in the economy, is not the result of
technocratic design but rather a result of political and economic

interests.

The understanding of the functioning of these political

institutions will help explain the success of the proposed reforms and

the viability of the actual patent system.
A.

Third Party Opposition System

One of the most important proposals of reform of the patent
regime in the United States is the creation of a post-grant
opposition/reexamination process for patents in the Patent Office. 5
The creation of this new regime has been the subject of intense
debate in academia, in law practice, and in the political spheres.

6

Those who favor adopting a post-grant reexamination system
emphasize the ways in which it will increase the quality of patents and

the ability of the Patent Office to detect errors and, therefore,
decrease the number of bad patents before these patents are widely
enforced.'0 7 The system will also give challengers the ability to raise

concerns over new patents without having to resort to expensive legal
procedures. 1 8 The low cost of the opposition process would increase
104. The bill introduced in 2005 was not successful in Congress. Patent Reform Act of
2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgiThe bill introduced in
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong-bills&docid=f:h2795ih.txt.pdf.
2007 was voted on by the House of Representatives in September 2007 and submitted to
the Senate. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); ROLL CALL,
supra note 92.
105. See Allen M. Leung, Legal Judo: Strategic Applications of Reexamination Versus
an Aggressive Adversary (Part 1), 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 471, passim
(2002).
106. Id. at 478.
107. See John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 159, 164-66 (1999) (describing the problems of the USPTO in
detecting obviousness in new technology patent requests); see also John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185, 210 (1998) (describing how prior art and obviousness are the main factors mentioned
in court for challenging the validity of patents).
108. See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits:
Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 757 (2002).
Anyone who has ever been involved in a patent infringement lawsuit knows
that "patent litigation is a very costly process." Attorneys and experts must be
hired and associated litigation costs incurred. According to a 1999 study by the
Intellectual Property Law Association, the median total cost through the end of
suit for patent litigation where the dollar amount at risk is $10-$100 million is
$2,225,000. Just to take the case through discovery costs $1,491,000.
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the access of these challengers to an efficient system for examining
patent validity. 109 The economic efficiency of the patent system
should increase, as more "bad" patents or errors made by the Patent
Office are detected and challenged using this inexpensive
mechanism."'
Finally, the opposition process would provide
incentives to the Patent Office to grant only high-quality patents and
avoid granting "bad" or obvious patents."' Frequent opposition
requests within the Patent Office would reflect badly on the
examiners and increase the Office's workload. This is important
because recently the Patent Office has been under fire for granting an
allegedly high number of partially or wholly invalid patents." 2
Despite these advantages, those opposed to the system point out
the many disadvantages of a post-grant opposition system." 3 An
opposition system should not be in charge of an administrative agency
like the Patent Office; the courts have been performing this task since
the Patent Office was established." 4 Furthermore, the expense of
litigating in court deters the inventor's competitors from challenging

The costs of litigation to parties involves more than the costs of retaining
attorneys and experts and paying for court costs, copying expenses, and
transcripts. Litigation also drains away firm resources by requiring managers and
other employees to focus time and attention on the litigation, instead of ordinary
firm business. For every hour that a lawyer spends preparing for, taking, or
defending a deposition, the client often spends an hour in fact-gathering or being
deposed.
Patent litigation imposes costs not only on parties, but also on courts. For
every incremental dollar spent in litigation by the litigants, additional costs are
often incurred by the judicial system as well. Thus, a rule that requires parties to
litigate instead of settling thus imposes substantial direct costs on the court system
and on the taxpayers who fund the system.
Id.
109. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 108 (noting that if an examination process was
cheaper, "the probability of a challenge will be higher").
110. See id. at 107-08 (explaining the cost advantages of a review system).
111. See id. at 108-09 (describing the gains from implementing a review system).
112. See supra note 7.
113. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF

COMPETITION & PATENT LAW & POLICY 18 (2003) ("Skeptics feared that opposition
procedures will be abused. They saw possibilities for expense and delay. For example,
former PTO Director Q. Todd Dickinson, although supporting an enhanced
reexamination/opposition system, drew attention to the fears that have been expressed by
the independent inventor community that oppositions could be used to impede their
ability to assert their patents. Some panelists questioned whether oppositions can ever
meaningfully substitute for litigation, and others expressed doubt that competitors will risk
'paint[ing] big targets on themselves' by actively opposing others' patents.").
114. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 107, at 205 (finding that just fifty-four percent of
the patents contested in court were considered valid).
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every patent in an attempt to impede the operation of business and
take economic advantage of it.
Some groups also resist the
implementation of this "second window" for opposition, because it
allows challengers to come forward even after the maximum time
span allowed by the bill. 1 5
Most of the debate on an opposition system has concentrated on
the normative side of the reform." 6 However, most studies have
failed to address the probability of Congress enacting these
reforms."' Despite any supposed advantage of any of these regimes,
the proposal can advance in Congress only if the groups with a stake
in the patent system and with influence over the congressional
committees will expect an increase in the net payoff they receive from
the patent system. Accordingly, we can use our model to understand
a proposal's chances of success, as well as the position each actor will
take with respect to it. This analysis allows us to assess and
understand the political nature of the patent system.
Next, we consider the consequences of implementing a postgrant opposition system. First, the introduction of an opposition
system, with a second window option, should improve the degree of
supervision over the Patent Office's examiners, because excessive
challenges to patents granted by a given examiner could lead to
questions regarding the examiner's competence.'
As a result,
examiners will try to increase the quality of their work to avoid too
many oppositions to the patents they have granted. Today, there is
no incentive for examiners to increase quality, because the
examination performed by the courts is detached from the
performance of the Patent Office.119 Furthermore, most of the cases
115. Dale L. Carlson & Robert A. Migliorini, Patent Reform at the Crossroads:
Experience in the Far East with Oppositions Suggests an Alternative Approach for the
United States, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 261, 261 (2006) ("On September 1, 2005,
Representative Lamar Smith introduced a 'Coalition Print' version of a patent reform bill
(Substitute bill H.R. 2795) into Congress. That bill included a post-grant opposition
procedure not later than nine months after grant. On April 5, 2006, Representative
Howard Berman introduced the Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006 ("PDQ Act"),
H.R. 5096, 109th Cong., (2006), into Congress. The proposed PDQ Act includes a socalled 'second window' for bringing an opposition, namely within six months of the alleged
infringer's receiving notice of suit.").
116. See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 102-17 (1997) (comparing U.S. and
European patent reexamination systems).
117. See id. at 117-22 (concluding that Congress should take action but not addressing
the chance of Congress taking action).
118. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 108-09 (analyzing the advantages of a third
party review system to control for bad patents).
119. See Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker, supra note 1, at 733.
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taken to court will end up in settlement between the parties without
receiving a final decision by the court on the validity of the patent.12
As a consequence of instituting the opposition system, we would
expect the quality of patents to increase.
Second, since the Patent Office will be in charge of, or closely
involved in, the opposition process, the fees for this procedure should
increase the revenue for the agency. Furthermore, since the new
regime will have an impact on the performance of the agency,
application fees could increase. As a result, Patent Office revenue
should increase. The speed of the Patent Office examination process
should decrease, as the new regime will increase the quality expected
from examiners. Prosecution fees should increase, because the new
examination procedure will require higher quality standards from
examiners and prosecution lawyers could then benefit from the
higher requirements to present a successful application.
Furthermore, prosecutors would need to make a better case to the
Patent Office if they want to avoid, or succeed in, opposition. The
impact of the proposed reform on litigation fees is ambiguous. Legal
fees should go down, since the new regime will be cheaper than
resorting to the courts.121 They could, however, stay the same, given
that cases taken to court require a higher level of research than the
process of review at the Patent Office, and in addition, litigation may
continue after an opposition. Without loss of generality, we assume
legal fees will stay constant. The quality of the courts should not
experience major changes. Nonetheless, because patents could be
challenged in this opposition system for an undetermined time
through the second window, the strength of a patent's exclusionary
rights should decrease. Given these changes, Table 17 presents the
partial and total effects for each actor if a post-grant opposition
system becomes a reality.

120. Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED.

CIR. B.J. 227, 234 (2004-05) (noting that a sampling of patent cases settled 71.7% of the
time).
121. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 1, at 108 (noting that lower costs will increase
patent validity and patent validity will decrease costs).
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Table 17: Introduction of an Opposition System
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Figure 5 shows each of the consequent factors from
implementing the opposition system on the actors' preferences. In
this figure, the width of the bars represents the strength of each group
in Congress-as defined in Part I-and the height of the bars
represents the size of the impact on their preferences. 2
The introduction of this reform will decrease the net benefit to
individual inventors, because the quality of patents will increase and
litigation fees will be reduced (Figure 5). In addition, the increase in
the Patent Office fees, the increase in prosecution fees, the decrease
in the speed of processing, and the weakening of property rights will
decrease an individual inventor's net benefits. As a result, many of
the advantages that the current patent system provides for small
122. See Appendix B infra for an explanation on the relative size of the impact of each
factor on actors' preferences.
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inventors (e.g., strong property rights and costly litigation through the
courts) will be eliminated. For example, the National Association of
Patent Practitioners ("NAPP"), which serves small inventors,
presented the following comments to Congress regarding the
proposed introduction of a post-grant opposition system:
If a District Court infringement case and an opposition, both
involving the same patent, are running simultaneously, there
should not be an automatic stay of either action. Courts should
have the same flexibility in this instance as they already employ
in determining whether to stay a District Court action in favor
of a reexamination. For example, if a patentee files an
infringement suit in District Court well before the opposition
commences, there should be no stay. Indeed in "rocket docket"
jurisdictions, the court may decide the case well before the
Patent Office can decide the opposition.'23

According to these comments, the NAPP accepts implementing
an opposition system but wants to limit the extent of the procedures
at the Patent Office and wants to preserve the ability of inventors to
resort to the courts. In this respect, the second window alternative
has a negative impact on individual inventors, because it will allow
challengers to use the Patent Office instead of the court system.
Companies affected by individual inventors' patents can resort to
low-cost opposition to challenge the validity of the patent. 124 In
addition, the cost of obtaining a patent will rise, imposing an extra
cost on individual inventors. As a result, individual inventors will not
support the opposition system. As a solution for individual inventors,
the new system could be designed to minimize the increases in
prosecution and processing fees, while allowing a small decrease in
the speed of examination. Furthermore, the elimination of the
123. NAT'L ASS'N OF PATENT PRACTITIONERS, COMMENTS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PATENT PRACTITIONERS ON THE PROPOSED PATENT ACT OF 2005, at
16 (2005), available at http://www.napp.org/resources/Comments%20-%20NAPP%202005
%20patent%20bill.doc.
124. Christopher L. Logan, Patent Reform 2005: H.R. 2795 and the Road to Post-Grant

Oppositions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 975, 994 (2006) ("Since the introduction of H.R. 2795,
small-firms around the country have been voicing their opposition to oppositions. Ronald
Riley, president of the Professional Inventor's Alliance, has been quoted as saying 'I
honestly feel that if we don't stop what the big companies are trying to do, there won't be
any opportunity for us. What they call patent reform is all about making it virtually
impossible to enforce the patents.' One commentator has noted that '[p]atents legendarily
protect the lone inventor, the pioneering genius in a garage, against the predation of big
companies. In reality, the opposite has usually been true.' Post-grant oppositions under
H.R. 2795 merely provide another tool with which large corporations may unfairly prey on
the little guy.").
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second window would make individual inventors less likely to fight
the opposition system.
Figure 5: Payofffor Each Group
Q. Quality
F: Fees USPTO
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P: Powr of USPTO
S: Processing Speed at USPTO

H-

HH
Itoiiidoal

Ifoc ntor

I

Corp(AS) Corp (BS)
Universities

Corp(AB)

Corp (BB)

Prosecutors

Litigators

USPTO

Courts

The opposition system will have the same effect on individual
inventors and small companies in the information technology,
pharmaceutical, and biotechnology sectors. These individuals and
small companies will lose because the Patent Office will have greater
power, patents will have higher quality, property rights will diminish,
patent application and prosecution fees will increase, and the speed of
processing applications will decrease. As a result, opposition system
reform will not be well received among individual inventors and small
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companies. They face higher costs, less bargaining power with bigger
companies, and a higher chance that their patents will be rejected.
In the case of universities, an increase in the quality of patents
will increase their payoff, while higher patent filing and prosecution
fees and the decrease in the speed of processing will have a negative

impact on their net payoff. An increase in the power of the Patent
Office and a decrease in the strength of property rights will have a

mixed effect on the payoff of universities. As a result, universities
will support this reform as long as the net result gives a positive
benefit, depending on which issue has more weight for their
purposes.125

Big corporations' preferences for an opposition system will split
among industries. Big corporations in technological sectors with a
low reliance on patents, like Microsoft and IBM, will welcome an

opposition system because they could resort to cheaper ways to

125. See Press Release, Ass'n of Am. Univs., H.R. 2795, The "Patent Act of 2005":
Comments by Ass'n of American Univs., American Council on Educ., Ass'n of American
Med. Colls., and Council on Gov't Relations (June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.acenet.edu/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentlD=10758&Template
=/CM/Contentdisplay.cfm.
The associations strongly support the creation of an administrative post-grant
opposition procedure such as that proposed in H.R. 2795. An opposition
procedure that is of finite, predictable duration and allows third parties to
challenge a patent based on the full array of issues of patentability, utility, and
adequacy of written descriptions would improve patent quality by providing a
relatively low-cost alternative to litigation to establish patent validity.
Two modifications to the post-grant opposition procedure of H.R. 2795 would
significantly improve this important new procedure:
"

Identify all parties requesting an opposition: All persons requesting an
opposition should be required to identify themselves and the real party
in interest, if different. It is fair and appropriate that a patent holder
should be able to know the identity of the party opposing the patent, and
no useful purpose is served by withholding the identity of the opposer.

"

Expand the timing of the opposition request: A 12-month, rather than 9month, window could benefit smaller entities, which may need more
time to identify and respond to patents about which they have concerns.
The added three months would still keep the opposition procedure
within the framework of a finite, predictable process.

It will be critical, however, for the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(U.S. PTO) to receive the resources necessary to implement this additional
administrative procedure. Failure to do so could cause significant increases in
patent pendency, undermining the considerable benefits that an effective postgrant opposition procedure could bring to the patent system.
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resolve conflicts than going to court. 2 6 For example, Microsoft has
been pushing for reforms because of the high litigation costs of having
27
to defend itself against smaller companies' patented inventions.'
The availability of a cheaper procedure will certainly enhance its

126. See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property, 109th Cong. 17-21 (Apr. 20, 2005) (testimony of
Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple Inc.), available at
http://promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/houseoversight/042005/prepared/lutt
on(bsa).pdf.
Apple attorney Richard Lutton testified before Congress on behalf of the
Business Software Alliance. Lutton testified,
[t]he Committee print ... addresses the two major areas where ... patent reform
is now timely: improving the quality of patents issued by the [PTO] and alleviating
the disruptive effects that excessive patent litigation now poses....
... Congress should focus on four key areas that will facilitate the issuance of
higher quality patents:
1. enhanced post-issuance processes to provide a second chance to intercept bad
patents;
2. curtailment of abusive continuation practices that lead to endless chains of
patents with ever-broader claims;
3. better support for receiving prior art, and better processes for building a
contemporaneous record that reflects the extent of the examination by the patent
examiner; and
4. adequate PTO training and funding....
[On the effects of excessive patent litigation] ... BSA believes there are five key
areas where changes are needed:
1. making clear that a patentee is entitled to claim damages only on the proportion
of the allegedly infringing product attributable to the patent, and not [on the
entire] multi-faceted product or system;
2. recalibrating the standard for an award of punitive damages for willful
infringement to focus on reprehensible conduct, [rather than the current
gamesmanship involving notice and opinions];
3. clarifying and reiterating the current.., statutory requirement that the issuance
of an injunction ... should be based on "principles of equity";
4. reducing the burden of proving a patent invalid to a "preponderance of the
evidence" in cases where the [PTO] did not consider the allegedly invalidating
prior art; and
5. clarifying section 271(f) of the existing patent statute to avoid discouraging
research and development work done inside the United States.
Id.
127. Q&A: Microsoft Press Pass, supra note 84.
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ability to defend itself.128 These big tech companies have formed
different organizations, like the Business Software Alliance and the
Information Technology Industry Council, to push for patent reform
that adequately reflects the new information technologies industry
requirements. 129 The positive payoff for these companies will come
from an increase in patent quality, the greater power of the Patent
Office, and the lower speed of processing for patent applications.
On the other hand, in the case of pharmaceutical and
biotechnology sectors, bigger companies will not accept the reform so
readily, because they believe they are better protected by the courts
and the current patent system. 3 ° These companies have also formed
their own organizations to lobby for strengthening the patent system.
The Biotechnology Industry Organization and PhRMA are two of the
best-known representatives of these sectors. 3 ' The net payoff of
these companies will increase because of the higher quality of patents;
the net payoff will likewise decrease because lower legal fees do not
offer effective protection in court against other competitors. The
increase in power of the Patent Office will increase the likelihood of
challenges to their patents, and more careful processing will
slowdown the granting of new patents.
However, some big
companies in both sectors will have a positive net impact from the
lower legal fees (i.e., their payoff increases because having to pay
lower legal fees offsets the cost of having to face more challenges in
court).
128. Perspectives on Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 173 (2005) (statement of David Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corp.), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1475&wit-id=4229. "Establishing
an administrative procedure for post-grant review and opposition would permit important
challenges to patent validity, short of litigation. Under such a system, the person opposing
the patent should be required to make a suitable threshold showing." Id.
129. See Business Software Alliance, http://www.bsa.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2009);
Information Technology Industry Council, http://www.itic.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
130. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, the "Patent Reform Act of
2005": Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property,
109th Cong. 25 (2005) (testimony of Robert B. Chess, Executive Chairman, Nektar
Therapeutics), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
109 househearings&docid=f:23434.pdf ("Mr. Chairman, perhaps no other industry is as
dependent upon patents as is the biotechnology industry. It is safe to say that most, if not
all, of the revolutionary medical advances developed by the biotechnology industry would
not exist had the U.S. Supreme Court not ruled in 1980 that biotechnology inventions
were entitled to patent protection. Because of the complexity of biotechnology, it can
easily take one or two decades, or more, for a biotechnology company to discover and
develop a profitable product that revolutionizes treatment of a disease that has resisted
conventional pharmaceutical or other medical treatment.").
131. See Biotechnology Industry Organization, http://www.bio.org (last visited Apr. 30,
2009); PhRMA, http://www.phrma.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
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The most important issue for pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies is the decrease in the strength of the exclusionary rights
associated with patents. 3 2 These companies would vigorously oppose
such a reduction in property rights, because the success of their
investments depends on strong enforcement of patents.'33
Big
companies in the software and information technology sectors will
undoubtedly support the reform, while companies in biotechnology
and pharmaceutical sectors will be reticent to do so. By eliminating
the second window, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
may support the reform, as the negative effect on property rights
would be reduced. As a result, we can see how the specific
characteristics of the technology sector and the ability of companies
to profit from the patent system will determine their willingness to
support this reform proposal.
The Patent Office will benefit from the increase in fees from both
the examination of patent grants and the management of the new
opposition regime. This increase in the net benefit of the Patent
Office would also be enhanced by the prospect that the agency will
gain political and bureaucratic influence with the introduction of the
new opposition regime. The costs for the Patent Office will be
represented by the decrease in the speed of processing, the higher
quality required by the new system, and the decrease in the strength
of property rights. If the Patent Office will manage the new
opposition system, then we believe that the gains for the agency will
compensate them for the costs, and therefore, the net effect of the
reform should be positive.
Prosecutors will be favored by the increase in quality and the
increase in importance of the Patent Office in managing this stage of
the patent system. These two positive factors should generate an
increase in prosecution fees. The higher cost for prosecutors will
arise from the decrease in the speed of processing and the diminished
strength of property rights. In general, the new system should imply
new business for prosecutors because of the enhancement of the
Patent Office's ability to manage and control the patent system. As a

132. See Stephen P. Marks, Typing Prometheus Down: The International Law of
Human Genetic Manipulation, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 115, 125 (2002) (noting the reliance of

biotechnology companies on property rights).
133. See Insoon Song, Old Knowledge into New Patent Law: The Impact of United
States Patent Law on Less-Developed Countries, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 261, 262

(2005) (commenting on why patent protection enables biotechnology companies to "stay
in business").
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result, the reform should increase the net benefits
for prosecutors,
14
who will then favor enacting the opposition reform.
Litigators will experience a different effect. Their net benefits
will decrease as a consequence of the higher quality of patents, the
lower strength of property rights, and the lower speed of the granting
process. Furthermore, as many patent challenges could be channeled
through the new opposition regime, the use of the courts will
decrease, and litigators will suffer from loss of business. As a
consequence, litigators should be expected to oppose the reform. The
only positive effect for litigators is that they could participate in the
challenges to new patents through the opposition process. However,
the fees for Patent Office opposition processes would be much lower
than in the case of court litigation. The income received in fees by
litigators could increase only if the increase in the volume of patents
challenged under the new system can produce an income in excess of
the loss for the lower number of patents being litigated in the courts.
Finally, for the courts, the increase in patent quality and the
decrease in processing speed should increase their net benefit, but the
lower strength of property rights would have a negative effect.
Courts should receive a lower load of patent cases, and the
information on the validity of the patent would be more efficient than
under the current system. Thus, the courts should be supportive of
the introduction of the new system as long as the positive effects
dominate.
Consequently, the success of this reform in Congress will depend
on the net effect it will generate on each of these groups and on the
specific political power each group exerts on congressional
committees. Individual inventors and small companies will not
support the reform. Because of their important influence on
Congress, big corporations will be the key for securing the passage of
the opposition system.
Software and information technology
companies will openly push for the reform, while biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies' support will depend on the extent of the
reform. For example, if proposals like the second window are
eliminated, the chances of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies supporting the reform will increase; otherwise, they will
134. See NAT'L ASS'N OF PATENT PRACTITIONERS, supra note 123, at 16 ("Post-grant
opposition has the potential to improve the U.S. patent system by quickly weeding out
invalid patents that slip through the USPTO despite the best efforts of patent examiners
and honest intentions of inventors, patent agents, and patent attorneys. This procedure
may assist holders of valid patents, because this forum permits validity issues to be quickly
and inexpensively resolved instead of having to resort to litigation.").
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oppose it. Given the increase in its revenue and the increase in the
regulatory and political status of the agency, the Patent Office will
favor the reform. Prosecutors and the courts will also back the
reforms, but litigators will oppose these reforms. As a result, the
political division among patent lawyers will be reflected in Congress,
given the political importance of the legal industry. Their influence
on Congress will be one of the deciding factors on the fate of the
reform.
B.

Patent Reform 2007-2008

Congress is currently considering an extensive proposed reform
to the patent system. This is not the first time Congress has
considered reforming the patent system.
On June 8, 2005,
Representative Lamar Smith (Texas) introduced H.R. 2795 to the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives.135 This bill
established several changes to patent law in an attempt to improve
the system.136 After long debate and hearings, the bill did not
advance in Congress.'37 More recently, under the 110th Congress,
Representative Howard Berman (California) introduced H.R. 1908 to
the House of Representatives. 38 The main changes proposed in this
bill are: implementing a post-grant opposition system, imposing exparte reexamination, limiting injunctions, reducing infringement
payments, changing the system to a "first inventor to file" system,
eliminating best mode regulation, imposing a duty of candor,
regulating continuation of applications, and creating a universal
eighteen months publication rule. 3 9 These changes prompted an
intense debate among different constituencies and groups affected by
the reform. 40 In this Section, we evaluate some of the most
important changes proposed to understand the patent reform bill's
135. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
136. Among the main changes are: the Rights of the First Inventor to File, Inventor's
Oath or Declaration, Right of the Inventor to Obtain Damages, Post Grant Procedures
and Other Quality Enhancements, Post Grant Review Procedure, Submissions by Third
Parties and Other Quality Enhancements, Tax Planning Methods not Patentable, Venue
and Jurisdiction, Inequitable Conduct as Defense to Infringement, Best Mode
Requirement, Regulatory Authority, and some other minor proposals. See id.
137. See THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
D?dl09:1:./temp/-bdcpkr:@@@XI/bss/109search.html
(last visited Apr. 22, 2009)
(summarizing the status of the Bill and all the actions taken by Congress).
138. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
139. Id.
140. See Anne Broache, Congress Takes New Stab at Patent System Overhaul, CNET

NEWS, Apr. 18, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Congress-takes-new-stab-at-patent-systemoverhaul/2100-1028_3-6177376.html.
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chances of passage. Because the creation of a post-grant opposition
regime was analyzed in the previous Section, we will not address that
issue here. Nor are we going into a detailed analysis of the first
inventor to file, because this has not been a highly debated issue, and
it is intended to bring the U.S. patent system in line with international
"'
standards on patents.14
Instead, we will address a few of the
remaining proposals as follows.

1. Ex-parte Reexamination
The ex-parte reexamination provision in the law allows for third

parties to bring additional information on a patent application to the
Patent Office during the examination period.142 This reform is an
attempt to reduce the number of frivolous patents and to increase the
quality of the patents granted. 143

The third party submitting

additional information would pay a fee to the Patent Office.1" The
bill also provides extra funding to the Patent Office to help cover the

141. See Perspectiveon Patents: Harmonizationand Other Matters: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005),
available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/109hrg/24582.pdf (containing
the introductory remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch that he "hope[s] that it will clarify some of
the arguments from multiple perspectives regarding moving from our traditional first-toinvent regime to the internationally adopted first-to-file system").
142. H.R. 1908 ("Any person may submit for consideration and inclusion in the record
of a patent application, any patent, published patent application, or other publication of
potential relevance to the examination of the application .... "). This language is similar
to H.R. 2795, proposed in 2005.
143. Katharine Zandy, Too Much, Too Little, Or Just Right? A Goldilocks Approach
To Patent Reexamination Reform, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 865, 879-80 (2006).
Reexamination must provide a viable mechanism for challenging patents that may
have been granted improperly, thus decreasing the licensing fees and chilling
effects caused by a multitude of bad patents impeding innovation. In order to do
so, such a reexamination process must provide a mechanism to present evidence to
an impartial judge who can determine whether or not a claim has merit. Such a
process must also be run efficiently and effectively within the PTO's resources-a
necessity which cannot be taken lightly, given current criticism of the PTO's
determinations of patent validity at the application stage.
However, if reexamination is too similar to litigation itself, it risks losing the
advantage of decreased time and cost for the parties involved. After all, in
creating a reexamination procedure, Congress implicitly recognized that some
alternative to litigation is needed to achieve the elusive balance between the needs
of patent challengers for a method to argue their claims and the needs of patentholders to be free from harassing challenges.
Id.
144. See H.R. 1908.
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costs of implementing this system.145 We assume that the fees and the
extra budget will allow the Patent Office to provide extra services in
order to maintain a similar speed of service, even though the time of
examination should increase. The reform would also discourage
individuals with less innovative inventions from applying, thereby
maintaining the current processing time. As a result, we assume that
the speed of examination does not change.
According to our model, this reform should have a direct
increase on the quality of granted patents and should discourage
further litigation in court, as there will be a decreased chance of

having an improvidently granted patent (Appendix A). The decrease
in court challenges should reduce litigation fees and increase the
power of the Patent Office, because the Office will more closely

examine patent applications. Since patent applications are going to
be subject to increased scrutiny, prosecutors' fees will increase,
because applications will have to be better prepared.
Table 18: Ex-parte Reexamination
Increase in Increase in Decrease in Increase in
Quality
Prosecution Litigation
Power of
Fees
Fees
Patent Office
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145. See The Patent System Today and Tomorrow: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of
David Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corp.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1475&wit-id=4229.
Different groups giving testimony to
Congress have mentioned this concern regarding funding. See id. ("BSA encourages
Congress to ensure that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has the resources it needs
to conduct patent examinations that are efficient, expedient and of the highest quality....
Allowing the Patent and Trademark Office to retain fees that it generates would help
ensure that the Office is able to provide high-quality examinations and to fund further
improvements.").
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aP

<0

ancouRT

-

aP

<0

Negative

Undetermined

Table 18 presents the effect of the reform on all inventor types.
As we can see in Table 18, individual inventors and small companies
in both technology sectors will be worse off with the reform. The
quality of the patents is going to increase the Patent Office's power,
thereby giving more validity to its patents. This will have a negative
impact on individual inventors and small companies, because the
chances of getting a patent through the Patent Office will decrease.
The decrease in litigation fees will have a mixed impact on their
payoff. Finally, higher prosecution fees will impose an important cost
on these actors. The net payoff for big companies in software and
information technology sectors will increase with the improvement in
the quality of patents and the greater role for the Patent Office in
conducting the examination process. The reduction of litigation fees
will have a positive impact on information technology companies, as
their cost of resorting to the courts will decrease. The reduction in
legal fees will have a negative effect on the payoffs of pharmaceutical
and biotechnology companies that strongly rely on patents. In the
case of big companies in biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors,
the increase in quality will have a positive effect on payoff. The
higher scrutiny of submissions at the Patent Office and the chances of
competitors presenting further information and delaying the granting
process for companies will generate a negative effect on net payoff.
Big biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are not as
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supportive of this change, in contrast to big companies in the other
technology sectors. Universities will benefit from the higher quality
of patents and the greater power of the Patent Office, but they are
going to be hurt by the general increase in fees.
Prosecutors are much better off with this reform. The enhanced
power of the Patent Office increases the demand for their services. In
addition, it could charge higher fees, and there would be extra
demand for the higher quality patents that would be granted. On the
other hand, litigators should be worse off, as the higher quality of the
patents and the enhanced role of the Patent Office will decrease the
need to use the courts, and this will result in reduced litigation fees.
The Patent Office will be better off because of its greater power, the
increase in fees for these processes, and the increase in its budget.
However, the increase in the efforts to provide better quality patents
through thorough examinations will decrease their payoff. The
Patent Office will be better off if the payment it receives is greater
than the costs of improving patent quality. Finally, the courts will be
indifferent to the reform, because the positive effect from the higher
quality of patents will be offset, in part, by the greater power of the
Patent Office. The final effect of this reform on the courts is
somewhat undetermined.
2. Damages
H.R. 1908 proposes to award reasonable damages and relate the
damages to the contributions in the patent over the prior art
involved. 46
The decrease in the payment of damages for

146. H.R. 1908.
SEC. 5 RIGHT OF THE INVENTOR TO OBTAIN DAMAGES.... [section
b.] ... '(1) IN GENERAL.-An award pursuant to subsection (a) that is based
upon a reasonable royalty shall be determined in accordance with this subsection.
Based on the facts of the case, the court shall determine whether paragraph (2),
(3), or (4) will be used by the court or the jury in calculating a reasonable royalty.
The court shall identify the factors that are relevant to the determination of a
reasonable royalty under the applicable paragraph, and the court or jury, as the
case may be, shall consider only those factors in making the determination.
'(2) RELATIONSHIP OF DAMAGES TO CONTRIBUTIONS OVER PRIOR
ART.-Upon a showing to the satisfaction of the court that a reasonable royalty
should be based on a portion of the value of the infringing product or process, the
court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty under
subsection (a) is applied only to that economic value properly attributable to the
patent's specific contribution over the prior art. The court shall exclude from the
analysis the economic value properly attributable to the prior art, and other
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infringement can be seen as a decrease in the legal and other costs
paid for using the court system (LFL) and a decrease in the strength of
property rights in the courts (PR). Table 19 shows the payoff each
actor receives from this reform. As we can see, individual inventors
will be worse off with this reform. The decrease in the power of the
courts to establish damage awards will have a negative effect on
individual inventors, because it will decrease their ability to profit

from their inventions, especially when they try to obtain royalties
from corporations. On the other hand, the lower litigation costs will
have a mixed effect on their payoff function. Universities will benefit
from the lower costs of using the courts, and the effects of weaker
property rights will be mixed."'

Small corporations face a situation similar to individual
inventors. They will be indifferent because of the lower litigation
fees, but they will strongly oppose the reduction in the strength of
property rights. Big companies in industries like software and
information technology will benefit from the decrease in the strength
of property rights because of lower infringement-related payments for
licenses and the like. They have historically had high costs associated
with handling these cases in court.148 Hence, they will also benefit

from a decrease in litigation fees, which has been a substantial burden
on their budgets.
In sectors like pharmaceuticals, big companies will be worse off,
because their royalties or damage awards will decrease and the ability
features or improvements, whether or not themselves patented, that contribute
economic value to the infringing product or process.
'(3) ENTIRE MARKET VALUE.-Upon a showing to the satisfaction of the
court that the patent's specific contribution over the prior art is the predominant
basis for market demand for an infringing product or process, damages may be
based upon the entire market value of the products or processes involved that
satisfy that demand.
'(4) OTHER FACTORS.-If neither paragraph (2) or (3) is appropriate for
determining a reasonable royalty, the court may consider, or direct the jury to
consider, the terms of any nonexclusive marketplace licensing of the invention,
where appropriate, as well as any other relevant factors under applicable law.
Id.
147. Press Release, Ass'n of Am. Univs., supra note 125 ("Section 6 (1)(B) appears
essentially to codify current case law. Since judges have ample discretion under current
law to assess the relative value of a patented technology in determining damages, we
believe Section 6 (1)(B) is unnecessary, and the attempt to codify case law could have
unintended negative consequences.
Therefore, we encourage deletion of this
subsection.").
148. See, e.g., Q&A: Microsoft Press Pass, supranote 84.
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to enforce their property rights will be diminished. At the same time,
it is less costly for competitors to challenge their patents in court.
Lawyers, both litigators and prosecutors, will be negatively affected
by this reform, because their fees will decrease as a consequence of
the lower payments courts can award and the decrease in the
effectiveness of their legal actions. The Patent Office will have a
negative payoff, because the decrease in the enforcement of patents
in courts will decrease the value of the patent the agency grants.
Courts will be negatively affected by this reform because of the
decrease in their enforcement power.
Table 19: Decrease Paymentsfor Infringement
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3. Best Mode Regulation
H.R. 1908 proposes to eliminate a clause in 35 U.S.C. § 112.149
As a result, inventors will no longer need to disclose the best mode to
replicate their invention at the moment of examination by the Patent
Office. Accordingly, it is expected that this reform will decrease
litigation costs and increase the predictability of litigation, thereby
increasing the quality of patents. Small companies and individual
inventors will be negatively affected by the increase in quality. Big
companies in software and information technology will be better off,
because litigation costs will go down. Moreover, they will no longer
have to provide the specific examples and methods of the invention,
which will eliminate some maneuvers by inventors trying to change
claims and procedures in slight ways in an effort to obtain new
patents or change their products to avoid infringement. However,
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies that rely on extensive
patenting and litigation will be against this reform. Litigators' payoff
will decrease because of lower litigation costs.
From the analysis of these case studies, one can see that the
proposed changes affect each actor differently. Because of the
different results on net payoffs, the different sectors will try to shape
the reform according to their preferences in order to maximize their
net gains. As analyzed before, the final result will depend on the
degree of influence each sector has on Congress. In order to evaluate
how each sector will benefit from this reform, Table 20 summarizes
the results of the foregoing analysis. Across sectors, small businesses
and individual investors are not favored by the reform, while big
software and information technology companies are the main
beneficiaries and, not surprisingly, the main supporters of the
reform.15 ° Big companies in biotechnology and pharmaceutical
sectors are not as favored by the reform as the other sectors, so we
would expect stronger opposition from them. Prosecutors, the Patent
Office, and the courts should support the changes because their tasks
will be facilitated. However, litigators are the main losers from this

149. H.R. 1908 ("Section 282(b) (as designated by section 12(b) of this Act) is
amended by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following: '(3) Invalidity of the
patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with-'(A) any requirement of section 112
of this title, other than the requirement that the specification shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention; or '(B) any requirement of
section 251 of this title.'.").
150. See, e.g., BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, PATENT REFORM: THE VERDICT IS
IN 9-10 (2007), http://www.bsa.org/-/media/63E3364BBA7148828D2CE880AF5371D2.
ashx.
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reform because of the improvements in quality and the fact that the
reduction in litigation and litigation costs would have a negative
impact on the number of cases taken to court and the associated
litigation fees.
Among the reforms with higher chances of passing without major
revision are the best mode regulation, duty of candor, and the
eighteen months publication regulation. Among the reforms that are
likely to pass with some changes are the opposition system and interparty examinations. Finally, the proposed reforms with higher
degrees of debate, and that are therefore unlikely to pass, are the
ones limiting injunctions and damage awards. As a consequence, the
success of the reform in Congress will depend on the ability of the
different sectors to bargain and reach agreement on the most divisive
issues proposed.
Table 20: Summary of Each Group Position with Respect to the
Reform
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CONCLUSION

In recent years, many proposals have arisen for changing the
patent system in the United States. Most of these proposals have
been normative in nature and based on overcoming the many
perceived shortcomings of the patent system. Nonetheless, actual
legislative reforms have failed to materialize.
In this Article, we claim that in order to understand the chances
of success of any reform to the patent system, we should take a closer
look at the system's political economy. In particular, we should be
aware of the different pressure groups with a stake in the system and
their ability to influence the congressional committees in which
reform legislation is enacted.
We have studied the different
constituencies favoring or opposing the reform and the strength of
their bargaining power based on publicly available empirical data of
political contributions by different groups and by taking into account
the effect of the patent system on different technology industries and
economic sectors. As shown, each proposal will generate winners and
losers who will try to push reforms forward or prevent them from
being enacted. In order to succeed, any reform needs a minimum
consensus among these groups of firms in different technology
sectors, the inventors, the patent bar (divided separately into patent
prosecutors and litigators), the Patent Office, and the courts.
Furthermore, our econometric analysis has demonstrated that the
passage of the bill in the House of Representatives was strongly
correlated to the resources that the primary stakeholders provided to
each of the congressional representatives. These results corroborate
our model of preferences of different groups and their pressure on
Congress to obtain the desired legislative outcomes and results.
In order to understand the dynamic interaction among these
groups, we evaluated three important proposed reforms: third party
reexamination, changes to the presumption of validity of patents, and
changes suggested in the Patent Reform Act of 2007. Important
conclusions emerged from this political economy analysis. First, we
concluded that the passage of any of these reforms is far from
straightforward. The gains and costs of each constituency have to be
addressed to reach a final determination of how one might reform the
patent system. Furthermore, the final result of any reform will depart
from the theoretical blueprint, given the political process we
described in this Article. As a consequence, a deeper understanding
of this political process allows us to better understand the dynamics of
reforms and the characteristics of the patent system. In the end, as in

2009]

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PA TENT SYSTEM

1413

any other institutional device, the characteristics and performance of
the patent system, plus its sustainability or reforms over time,
depends on the preferences of the polity, specifically on the
preferences of the groups with a definite stake in the performance of
the system.
This Article also determined that the effects of the patent system
on different technology and economic sectors will ultimately shape
the different constituencies favoring or opposing the reform.
Companies in networked industries, where the pace of innovation is
Excessive
fast, may not rely heavily on the patent system.
enforcement of patent property rights can produce negative effects
for them, even though some companies in this sector will benefit.
Specifically, we showed that small companies that use patents as
leverage over big companies benefit from strict property rights
enforcement. Nonetheless, big companies, like Microsoft or IBM,
form a more powerful lobby in Congress to push for reform. On the
other hand, there are economic sectors that depend significantly on
patents for market innovation. These are sectors, like pharmaceutical
and biotechnology, where innovations are produced by more
monolithic, vertically integrated companies. For these sectors, one of
the main defenses against appropriation of their technological
innovation is the patent system and the courts. As a result, we
observed that the support for any reform to the patent system will
depend on the specific factors that define the structure of each
economic sector. Furthermore, we found that in each sector, there
are different preferences, depending on the economic power and
particular stake in the patent system. Our analysis of the votes cast
by individual congresspersons, correlating the votes to contributions
made by various sectors, shows that Congress does not have a point
of view independent from the stakeholders in the patent system.
Rather, their votes on the Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908,
reflect the participation and preferences of major stakeholders, such
as the information technology industry, the pharmaceutical industry,
the law associations, and the manufacturing sector.
In the past fifty years, we have witnessed piecemeal patent
legislation (e.g., the American Inventors Protection Act) passed by
Congress, but no comprehensive effort at patent reform culminating
in congressional floor votes prior to 2007. In the coming years, if we
see more congressional votes on comprehensive patent reform bills,
our understanding of the political economy of the patent system will
most certainly improve.
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APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX B

In general, the effect of each factor on the payoff function of
each actor is determined subjectively. Nonetheless, from our analysis,
we can infer that there are some issues that matter more to some
groups than others. Accordingly, to reflect this in our analysis, we
assume the following:
Change
Patent Office
Fees

Rank of Effects on Preferences (In absolute value)
Patent Office >Individual=Universities=AS=
BS=Prosecutors=Litigators

Quality
Prosecution Fees
Power of Patent
Office

AB>Court=Patent Office=Universities=Prosecutors>
Individual=AS=BS>BB>Litigators
Prosecutors>Universities=Individuais=AS=BS
Patent Office>AS=AB=BS=BB=Universities=
Individuals=Court=Litigators=Prosecutors

Speed

Patent Office-AS=AB=BS=BB=Universities=
Individuals=Court=Litigators=Prosecutors

Strength of
Property Rights

BB=AS=BS=Individual>AB=Litigators>Patent
Office=Court=Prosecutors>Universities

Nonetheless, this rank could change depending on the issue at
stake.
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APPENDIX C: SIMULTANEOUS PROBIT MODEL
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Contributions from the Information Sector
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0.395976
-0.37

0.502665
0.5

-0.71583

0.356842

sigma

Loglike

Democrats
-0.03

0.469437
-0.36

0.527172
subcommittee

-0.02594

0.002057

0.003401

0.000414

0.000466

0.967495

0.737935

0.08839

0.292638

1661.614

1461.901

1.05

Contributions from the Manufaturing Sector
Republicans
manufrep

-49.9396

-19.61

27.98754

-302.885

Democrats
-302.81

64.58375

manufdem

-2.78071

-1.09

18.92053
republican

-0.96314

texas

0.688177

-0.37

0.369248

0.24

0.570671

0.1571

0.899525
-0.94449

0.31

-1.06381

-0.35

_cons

1.018463

-0.05432
-0.75177

-0.05

0.449991

-0.9593
-1.029
1,013538

0.245954

-0.36

-0.49214

-0.38

-0.59122

0.32

0.714448

0.367639

0.606114

0.535454

0.263847

0.540858

0.867742

0.101003

0.24469

0.110052

0.100744

-214.54

0.003148

0.003296

0.000502

0.00063

0.881946

0.836932

0.240018

0.275472

1492.681 1

-216.411

0.25
-0.49
-0.59

0.515181

0.529345

rho

0,26

0.48524

0.509055
0.45

0.262612

0.505366

0.418369
-0.75

-1.15

0.364018
0.32

0.247911

0.480359
0.32

0.938855

-254.58

0.316897
0.22

0.292124
0.23

-1,15247

0.370152

sigma

Logike

0.22605

-0.42

0.148929

0,668029
-0.39

0.496266
subcommittee

0.631779

0.465814

0.420133
newerse

0.57

0.363449

0.244042
ohio

-1.10469

0.64954

0.297161
california

0.37

-254.575
83.74559

1472.83

0.71

2009]

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PA TENT SYSTEM
Contributions from the Attorney Sector
R.pubians

AttomeyRep

9.234871

3.62

55.72249

-678145

Democrats

-678.15

274.4216

AttomeyDem

97.93576

38.26

37.14739

republican

-1.11318

-0.42

0.167126

texas

0.635138

california

0.944821

0.22

-1.02888

-0.36

-cons

1.009157

0.410365
-0.5079

-0.38

-0.49192
0.859951

0.682552
1.009494

0.24

-0.87307
-1.09016

-0.33

1.041444

0.357996
0.599337
-0.87597

-0.4

-0.92047
0.78287

0.358069

0.376102

0.534323

0.362688

0.228292

0.902423

0.101003

0.190952

0.146796

0.267459

-216.408

0.001107

0.002809

0.000151

0.000434

0.761145

0.592474

0.292903

0.229209

1901.545

-212.122

0.6
-0.88
-0.92

0.554346

0.32

0.38372

rho

0.36

0.334561

0.519614

0.86

-1.32

0.323342

0.415077

-0.49

-1.32086

0.306611

0.33

0.241954

-0.51

-119

0.19598

0.285406

0.41

0.577201

0.32

-0.31

0.367507

sigma

Loglike

0.25

0.483423

0.509369

subcommittee

0.247097

-0.80762

-119.003
100.4039

0.175174

0.427065

0.419967

newjersey

0.34

0.333144

0.32

0.248673

-0.96129

0.338292
0.798828

0.29281

ohio

1419

1540.93

0.78

1420
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